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ABSTRACT 
Publicized incidents involving espionage or violence by government employees with 
security clearances have raised concern for the personnel security community. The 
guidelines used to adjudicate security clearances were last updated in 2005; since that 
time, significant technological developments, especially in social media and 
communications, have emerged.  
This thesis developed a comprehensive list of current Internet behaviors, and used 
the list to examine Internet behavior in cases of cleared government employees who have 
been charged with espionage or terrorism-related crimes since 2008. Cases showed a 
trend of increasing variety of behaviors in these cases with time. In contrast, data from 
the Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals (DOHA) pertaining to proposed security 
clearance denials related to the Use of Information Technology Systems guideline 
showed a slight decrease. Incorporation of cybervetting into the background investigation 
process is proposed as a measure to enhance mitigation of questionable Internet 
behaviors, and may result in an increase in security clearance denials.  
 Examination of the list of Internet behaviors against the current adjudicative 
guidelines resulted in recommended improvements for the Foreign Influence, Financial 
Considerations, Personal Conduct, Handling Protected Information, and Use of 
Information Technology Systems guidelines. Operations Security is proposed as a 
completely new adjudicative guideline. 
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I. NEW TECHNOLOGIES AND EMERGING THREATS: 
PERSONNEL SECURITY ADJUDICATIVE GUIDELINES IN THE 
AGE OF SOCIAL NETWORKING 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Recent events have shown that the U.S. government’s information, personnel, and 
facilities are vulnerable to insider threats. Army Major Nidal Hasan is charged with 
opening fire at Fort Hood on November 5, 2009, killing 13 people and wounding 32 
more.1  Six months later, Bradley Manning was arrested for his alleged involvement in 
the public disclosure of over 250,000 classified documents.2 Both individuals held active 
security clearances. One of the ways the government works to reduce the risk posed in 
such cases is to conduct background investigations on individuals seeking access to 
classified national security information. These background investigations are adjudicated 
according to a set of guidelines known as the Adjudicative Guidelines for Determining 
Eligibility for Access to Classified Information. Originally approved in 1997 and updated 
in 2005, they provide agencies with a framework for approving or denying access to 
classified information. Since 2005, society has seen advancement in technology, 
especially in the area of social media. However, the guidelines have not been updated to 
address these advancements or their implications for security clearance eligibility. In 
support of that objective, this thesis will examine some of the issues surrounding the 
integration of recent and emerging technologies into the adjudicative guidelines.   
B. PROBLEM SPACE 
One of the key vulnerabilities in the homeland security environment is risk posed 
by insider threats. Personnel security, including the investigation and adjudication of 
employee backgrounds, is one of a variety of disciplines that work collectively to 
mitigate this risk. Applicants for employment and security clearances voluntarily submit 
                                                 
1 U.S. Senate, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs,  A Ticking Time Bomb: 
Counterterrorism Lessons from the U.S. Government’s Failure to Prevent the Fort Hood Attack,  February 
3, 2011,  http://www.hsgac.senate.gov//imo/media/doc/Fort_Hood/FortHoodReport.pdf?attempt=2.  
2 Kevin Poulsen and Kim Zetter, “U.S. Intelligence Analyst Arrested in WikiLeaks Video Probe,” 
Wired, June 6, 2010, http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2010/06/leak/.  
 2 
to background investigations by the government, which are in turn adjudicated according 
to an established set of adjudicative guidelines. These guidelines were most recently 
updated in 2005, prior to the advent of widely popular social networking sites such as 
Facebook and Twitter. 
The thesis examines the adjudicative guidelines in light of new developments in 
technology and the corresponding uses of that technology by individuals and groups. 
Unlike the Internet of the 1990s, today’s Internet (often dubbed “Web 2.0”) is more 
dynamic, interactive, collaborative, and user-generated. An expansive variety of 
platforms exist for social interaction, the sharing of media, and connecting with others 
from around the world in ways that were never before possible. While enabling 
collaborative efforts for noble causes such as responding to natural disasters, fighting 
disease, and raising money for charity, these Internet platforms have also provided new 
ways to further criminal, illicit, or otherwise questionable behaviors that could impact 
eligibility for a security clearance or employment suitability. This thesis seeks to further 
our understanding of what kinds of activities are related to these technologies, how these 
technologies are used by insider threats, how the government is responding, and the 
impacts on the personnel security guidelines. This topic is important to investigate 
because a government’s policies should advance alongside the society it intends to serve. 
If policies become outdated, there could be the potential for increased government 
vulnerability as new technology would allow for potentially dangerous practices and 
behaviors that were not considered at the time the policies were created.  
This research effort focuses on the adjudicative guidelines that accompany 
Executive Order 12968, which were most recently updated and approved in 2005.3  A 
different standard, Intelligence Community Policy Guidance (ICPG) 704.2, is used for  
 
 
                                                 
3 Katherine Herbig, The Evolution of Adjudicative Guidelines in the Department of Defense 
(Monterey, CA: Department of Defense Personnel Security Research Center, 2011), 26, 
http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA563952. 
 3 
adjudicating access to Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI).4  While this thesis 
will not explicitly evaluate ICPG 704.2, its implications could also inform discussion of 
possible updates to that standard as well.  
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
1. In what kinds of online activities are insider threats engaging? 
2. How is online activity by insider threats changing over time? 
3. What impacts do emerging information technologies have on the 
capabilities and limitations of the personnel security adjudicative 
guidelines to mitigate insider threats?   
4. Further, how can the adjudicative guidelines address such impacts and 
provide federal government agencies with the necessary tools to mitigate 
this risk?   
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
This literature review examines the existing research on the topic of insider threat 
in general, as well as the topic of current technology’s impact on personnel security 
guidelines. This review found four main approaches to understanding insider threat in the 
literature: demographical, psychological, environmental, and meta-analytical. There were 
few resources that examined the ways in which information technology can be used as a 
tool in support of these four approaches, suggesting an opportunity for further research in 
related areas.   
It is important to identify a working definition of two key terms used in this 
thesis. A RAND Corporation report defines the insider as “Anyone with access, privilege, 
or knowledge of information systems and services.”5 This definition focuses on 
information systems, but for the purpose of this thesis, an insider will include any person 
with special access, clearance, privilege, or knowledge of information exceeding that of 
the general public, not limited to information systems alone. This includes all federal 
agency employees, security clearance holders, authorized contractors, detailees, student 
interns, or other individuals given such privileges. The same RAND report defines a 
“malicious insider” as an insider who is “motivated to intentionally adversely impact an 
organization’s mission.”6 This thesis will combine these two concepts into one definition 
of insider threat: Any person with access, clearance, knowledge of information, or other 
privilege exceeding that of the general public, who is motivated to intentionally adversely 
impact an organization’s mission. 
The other key term used in this thesis is espionage. As this is a more common 
term and concept than insider threat, a simple Merriam-Webster dictionary definition will 
suffice as a starting point: “the practice of spying or using spies to obtain information 
about the plans and activities especially of a foreign government or a competing 
                                                 
5 Richard C. Brackney and Robert H. Anderson, Understanding the Insider Threat: Proceedings of a 




company.”  This definition implies that the information provides some sort of advantage 
for the collector in an environment of competition, such as for one government or 
business over another. It also implies that the information is not already available through 
overt means, such as publicly available sources. The definition also appears to be limited 
to human collection methods and does not include use of technical or automated means of 
obtaining information. In light of these observations and for the purpose of this thesis, 
espionage will be defined as the practice of obtaining secret, non-public, or otherwise-
privileged information about a competitor. Espionage, by this definition, would be largely 
engaged in by governments and businesses, but not limited to these entities. Terrorists, 
criminals, and members of the general public could also engage in this activity insofar as 
it may further their various individual aims. Thus the nexus between insider threat and 
espionage is that espionage is one of the activities that malicious insiders may engage in, 
and insider threat is the overall term to describe this dynamic.  
With these two key terms in mind, the key research on insider threat can be 
examined more fully. As described initially, the relevant literature can generally be 
organized into four main approaches to the understanding of insider threat. These 
approaches can be construed as lenses through which to understand the insider threat 
dynamic and to find ways to prevent or mitigate its negative impacts. The following three 
sections describe these approaches and briefly discuss the implications, advantages, and 
disadvantages of each.  
A. DEMOGRAPHICAL APPROACH 
This approach studies the demographics of past insider threat actors in order to 
identify common traits or characteristics. Some of the research efforts undertaken by the 
Department of Defense (DoD) Personnel Security Research Center (PERSEREC) have 
included statistical analysis of demographic information in past offenders of espionage, a 
form of insider threat activity. Examples of such demographic information include 
country of origin, citizenship status, age, gender, religion, and other factors. Researchers 
using this approach can then draw statistical conclusions to characterize and understand 
commonalities across different offenders. For example, PERSEREC has created a 
 7 
database that captures biographical and employment characteristic data from published 
espionage cases, which can then be analyzed to draw statistical conclusions to guide 
policy and decision making. One study of this database found that since the end of the 
Cold War, individuals who engage in espionage are statistically more likely to be male, 
non-white, over the age of 30, married, well-educated, heterosexual, not in the uniformed 
military, and hold a security clearance.7 While explicitly not an attempt to create a single 
profile of a spy8, readers can draw profile-like conclusions in specific aspects of a 
demographic. Notably, this is also the approach taken by researchers, including renowned 
terrorism expert Bruce Hoffman, in a 1990 study of insider crime at nuclear facilities.9 
The obvious downside of this approach is that it is not fully predictive, as there may be 
individuals who commit insider threat activities but do not fit the statistical profile. 
Decision makers who allocate resources according to a statistical profile may still fail to 
identify or prevent an insider from causing damage. 
B. PSYCHOLOGICAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL APPROACHES 
Another approach to studying insider threat is to study the psychological 
characteristics and traits of individuals, in order to identify individuals with problematic 
or abnormal psychological conditions that could indicate propensity toward insider threat 
activity. A key research item, “The Insider Threat to Information Systems: The 
Psychology of the Dangerous Insider” was published in 1998 by Eric Shaw, Keven Ruby, 
and Jerrold Post.10  The conclusions appear to have driven, or at least are consistent with, 
a significant portion of the overall body of research on insider threat. The authors 
                                                 
7 Katherine L. Herbig, Changes in Espionage by Americans, 1947-2007 (Monterrey, CA: Department 
of Defense Personnel Security Research Center, 2008),  7–29, http://www.dhra.mil/perserec/reports/tr08-
05.pdf.  
8 Katherine L. Herbig and Martin F. Wiskoff, Espionage Against the United States by American 
Citizens, 1947-2001 (Monterrey, CA: Department of Defense Personnel Security Research Center, 2002), 
15, http://www.dhra.mil/perserec/reports/tr02-05.pdf.  
9 Bruce Hoffman, et al., Insider Crime: The Threat to Nuclear Facilities and Programs (Santa 
Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1990), 
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/reports/2007/R3782.pdf.  
10 Eric D. Shaw, Keven G. Ruby, and Jerrold M. Post, The Insider Threat to Information Systems: The 
Psychology of the Dangerous Insider (Richmond, VA: Department of Defense Security Institute, 1998), 
http://www.pol-psych.com/sab.pdf.  
 8 
approach the problem as one of psychological predispositions in individuals who commit 
insider threat activities. They develop a psychological profile of the malicious 
information technology insider, which includes introversion, social and personal 
frustrations, computer dependency, ethical flexibility, reduced loyalty, sense of 
entitlement, anger at employers, and lack of empathy. The authors also caution that, 
The presence of any or all of these personal and cultural vulnerabilities 
does not, however, a perpetrator make. Indeed, it is more often the 
dynamic interaction between… personal psychology (including the 
vulnerabilities enumerated above) and the organizational and personal 
environment that leads the vulnerable [insider] down a slippery slope, at 
the end of which an act of information system aggression occurs.11  
The article identifies a common pathway to insider threat:  predisposing personal 
traits, an acute situational stressor, emotional fallout, biased decision-making or judgment 
failures, and failure of peers and supervisors to intervene effectively.  
The approach taken by the above article can be further broken down into two 
components: the psychological approach as described, and an environmental approach 
that places psychological traits in external context. This environmental approach studies 
the external elements of an insider’s environment that either allow or disallow him to 
conduct harmful activities. The focus here is on internal controls, need-to-know, 
password protection and encryption, the two-man rule, and other controls. In another 
PERSEREC report, Insider Risk Evaluation and Audit, the authors use analysis of past 
known cases of insider damage to develop self-assessments for organizations and 
recommended countermeasures.12  This approach does not readily address psychological 
factors of employees or suggest various forms of psychological counseling to address 
issues. Rather, the report gives employers guidance on how to create and maintain a 
secure environment with internal controls. While the psychological and environmental 
approaches are very closely linked, it may be helpful for the insider threat analyst to 
break down a single set of activity into psychological and environmental components.  
                                                 
11 Shaw, Ruby, and Post, The Insider Threat, 8. 
12 Eric D. Shaw, Lynn F. Fischer, and Andree E Rose, Insider Risk Evaluation and Audit (Monterrey, 
CA: Department of Defense Personnel Security Research Center, 2009), 
http://www.dhra.mil/perserec/reports/tr09-02.pdf. 
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C. META-ANALYTICAL APPROACH 
Advances in computer technology and the automated processing of large volumes 
of data have enabled the development of the meta-analytical approach to identifying 
insider threat. The approach relies on the collection of a wide variety of employee-related 
data streams, including emails, phone call records, attendance including absences and 
leave requests, arrival and departure records, disciplinary records, computer logs, etc. 
Computer systems could be designed to observe this “big data” of employee behavior 
over time in order to build a baseline of normalcy. This baseline could then be compared 
to a specific individual’s activities in order to identify those that are unusual for a certain 
job type, or new behaviors not typical of a given employee’s past behavioral history. The 
primary challenges in this approach are that these data sources are often unavailable to 
federal government employers, and that such information is collected and managed in 
separate agency compartments such as IT, HR, Security, Contracting, or other offices and 
not centrally stored or analyzed in one place. These challenges would need to be 
addressed in order to maximize the potential of the meta-analytical approach.    
Even in light of potential challenges in its application, this approach appears to be 
receiving the most attention in future research projects and funding. In November 2011, 
the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) began funding a collective 
effort by the Georgia Institute of Technology and four other organizations to create a 
suite of algorithms that turn disparate data feeds into real-time alerts of anomalous 
activity. DARPA is funding the project for $9 million dollars under its Anomaly 
Detection at Multiple Scales (ADAMS) project.13  DARPA is also funding future 
research on a Cyber Insider Threat (CINDER) program, with specific projects yet to be 
announced. This effort is seen as updating Cold War security practices for the 
Information Age. According to the chief security officer of RSA, Inc., "If you think 
classically, how would you find indicators in people's activities? Large deposits in their 
bank accounts, changes in the way they drive to work. Those types of human intelligence 
                                                 
13 Abby Robinson, “Georgia Tech Helps to Develop a System that will Detect Insider Threats from 
Massive Data Sets,” Georgia Institute of Technology, November 10, 2011, 
http://www.gatech.edu/newsroom/release.html?nid=72599.  
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observations that we saw classically during the Cold War, we are just extending to the 
dark side of cyberspace."14 While current research articles and publications do not use 
meta-analysis, future research will likely provide the security community with new 
insights gained from such an approach. 
D. APPLICATION OF PERSONNEL SECURITY POLICIES TO 
EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES 
This review found very few reliable resources that examined ways for agencies or 
companies to adjudicate or otherwise justly dispose of emerging technology-based 
behaviors and incidents in applicant and employee backgrounds. DoD PERSEREC has 
published two reports that examine the practice of using online technology including 
social media as part of the background investigative process, which is known as 
cybervetting.15 These reports provide a foundation for agencies that are examining 
whether or not to conduct cybervetting on their applicants, and how to do so with respect 
to privacy and legal constraints. These reports do not include recommendations for 
adjudicating the information that could be found using cybervetting techniques, perhaps 
because there are a variety of agencies operating at multiple levels of government 
including federal, tribal, state, and local, each with their own legal frameworks within 
which they adjudicate the collected cyber and other background information. Thus the 
adjudicative aspect of this topic is too agency-specific for one product to address.  
Another PERSEREC project is aimed at understanding the impact of participation 
in cyber activities, known as cyber culture, on personnel security and more closely 
addresses issues related to adjudication for security clearances. One study, “Ethnographic 
Analysis of Second Life,” examined the Second Life virtual world its impact on 
employment for a sample of its users. The study’s goals were to: describe behaviors of 
                                                 
14 Robert Lemos, “Analyzing Data to Pinpoint Rogue Insiders,” Dark Reading. November 29, 2011, 
http://www.darkreading.com/insider-threat/167801100/security/security-
management/232200401/analyzing-data-to-pinpoint-rogue-insiders.html.  
15 See Andree G. Rose, et al., Developing a Cybervetting Strategy for Law Enforcement, (Monterey, 
CA: International Association of Chiefs of Police and Defense Personnel Research Center, 2011), 
http://www.iacpsocialmedia.org/Portals/1/documents/CybervettingReport.pdf; and Rose, A.G. et al., 
Guidance for Developing a Cybervetting Strategy for National Security Positions, (Monterey, CA: Defense 
Personnel Security Research Center, 2011), (For Official Use Only). 
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personnel security concern that individuals exhibit in Second Life using the Adjudicative 
Guidelines for Determining the Eligibility for Access to Classified Information as a 
framework; describe the nature, breadth, and severity of real-life behavioral 
consequences, i.e., “spillover,” resulting from involvement in Second Life; and develop 
an initial typology framework for distinguishing between innocuous and problematic 
forms of participation in Second Life.16  This report represents the first effort identified 
in this literature review that explicitly tries to identify virtual behaviors of concern 
through the lens of the personnel security guidelines. Another related project that is under 
development by PERSEREC includes surveys of clearance holders to identify how they 
use Internet technology in order to determine how prevalent certain behaviors are in the 
cleared workforce.17    
In addition to the above PERSEREC efforts, a study sponsored by the Office of 
the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) surveyed the prevalence of social 
networking accounts in a voluntary sample of 349 security clearance holders, and then 
examined those social networking accounts for examples of derogatory information. The 
study found that Internet research yielded derogatory information on 13% of the 
participants, and 13% of that information was considered “possible illegal activity.”18 A 
key conclusion of the report was that reviewing an applicant’s public online profile may 
allow for a more complete overview of his or her background.19 This report was valuable 
in that it provided insight into the prevalence of use and derogatory information that 
cybervetting could yield. However, it did not describe the range of activities it counted as 
derogatory, and does not make recommendations regarding if or how to change the 
present adjudicative guidelines.  
                                                 
16 Olga Shechter, Eric Lang, and Christina Keibler, Cyberculture and Personnel Security: Report II – 
Ethnographic Analysis of Second Life (Monterey, CA: Defense Personnel Security Research Center, 2011), 
vii, http://www.dhra.mil/perserec/reports/tr11-03.pdf.  
17 Informal conversations with PERSEREC staff, April 2012. 
18 Office of the Director of National Intelligence, “Social Networking Study,” In Electronic Freedom 
Foundation, May 14, 2010, 37, 43, https://www.eff.org/file/31845#page/1/mode/1up.  
19 Office of the Director of National Intelligence, “Social Networking Study,” 44. 
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Another study developed a taxonomy, or list, of cyber behaviors, identified 
prevalence rates of these behaviors in samples of two different populations, and discussed 
issues surrounding the prediction of cyber risk.20  One of the report’s suggestions for 
future research included a review of the adjudicative guidelines in light of these cyber 
behaviors,21 which is consistent with the research goals of this thesis.  
E. SHORTCOMINGS AND GAPS 
The analysis of past and ongoing efforts shows a number of areas where the 
overall body of research on insider threat and cyber behaviors is potentially biased, 
insufficient, or lacking. The preponderance of the research has been funded and/or 
directed by DoD, with some efforts recently sponsored by ODNI. This fact has the 
potential to skew research topics or findings toward particular sets of agency needs, and 
may mean that not all potential approaches or aspects of insider threat have received 
appropriate research attention for other stakeholders, such as the homeland security 
community, government industry, or the not-for-profit sector. For example, the use of 
temporary or volunteer staff may be more widely used in other sectors and provide 
different challenges to vetting cyber behaviors that are not as prevalent in the defense or 
intelligence communities. 
The other primary shortcoming in the research on insider threat is its domination 
by demographical and psychological approaches. While the demographical approach 
paints a statistical profile of past offenders, it does not show causality between 
demography and insider threat. The psychological approach is also incomplete, as even 
with all psychological indicators present a person might still not become an insider 
threat;22 likewise, a person may be an insider threat without displaying any of the 
identified indicators. The meta-analytical approach has similar limitations in that a 
person’s unusual patterns of activity may not necessarily mean they pose a threat. The 
psychological and meta-analytical approaches also have limitations on their use in the 
                                                 
20 Steven S. Russel, et al., Cyber Behavior and Personnel Security: Final Report (Minneapolis: 
Personnel Decisions Research Institutes, Inc., 2009), 1. 
21 Ibid., 115. 
22 Shaw, Ruby, and Post, The Insider Threat to Information Systems, 8.  
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government setting: many federal agencies do not conduct psychological assessments of 
candidates, even for security clearance positions; and the technical and privacy 
challenges of collecting wide-ranging data on employees may be difficult for federal 
agencies to overcome. Both approaches also carry significant monetary and resource 
costs to implement. 
As for the recent efforts to understand emerging technology and impact on the 
security guidelines, the work has centered on taking samples of current security clearance 
holders, and through surveys and voluntary review of online presence, determine how 
these individuals use the technology. These efforts have not included more in-depth 
studies of actual insiders who have damaged national security to examine their online 
presence and activities. They have also not examined recent data on security clearance 
decisions to understand whether the number of cases of computer-related security 
clearance denials could show an increase in computer or online presence in the applicant 
population. Lastly, the research does not compare online behaviors with the present 
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III. METHOD 
As discussed in the first chapter, this thesis has four essential research questions. 
The first question asks in what kinds of online activities insider threats are engaging. To 
answer this question, a sample of case studies will be examined with special emphasis on 
what online or virtual activities the suspects were engaged in prior to their arrest. The 
case studies include federal government employees who were arrested for crimes related 
to espionage or terrorism. These employees all held active or previously-active security 
clearances at the time of arrest. Given the recent nature of the technological and social 
media developments, the case studies are taken only from the past five years and include 
individuals arrested during that time period. Online searches were conducted in order to 
collect relevant case information, which was used to formulate a brief case narrative and 
identification of online activities in which insiders were engaged.  
The second research question asks how the online activity of insider threats has 
changed over time, including how many different activities were present for each case. 
To answer this question, two research activities were conducted. First, Internet and 
academic research23 was conducted to develop a list of online behaviors and activities, 
organized by category and theme. This list was meant to be as inclusive as possible, but 
not exhaustive. The insider threat case studies were then analyzed for the presence of 
these behaviors in each case, and a numerical tally of the number of activities for each 
case was then conducted. This tally was designed to show, with a very limited sample, 
whether Internet use among the recent cases had changed, and if so, how. An increase in 
the number of different activities was expected, as society in general is increasing its 
variety of online activities and presence. The time period examined was approximately 
the past five years, including any case from 2008 to the present. The Case Studies section 
will identify these cases and provide a brief overview of each of them, which will aid in 
                                                 
23 Among the sources reviewed in developing this list were Yvonne Jewkes and Majid Yar, Handbook 
of Internet Crime (Cullompton: Willan Publishing., 2010); Steven S. Russel, et. al., Cyber Behavior and 
Personnel Security: Final Report; Ken Dunham and Jim Melnick, Malicious Bots: An Inside Look into the 
Cyber-Criminal Underground of the Internet (Boca Raton: Auerbach Publications, 2008); and A Complete 
Hacker’s Handbook: Everything You Need to Know About Hacking in the Age of the Web, 1st Edition, 
http://www.telefonica.net/web2/vailankanni/HHB/index.html.  
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further discussions in later chapters. The list of cases examined there represents some of 
the most significant cases made public since 2008, based on damage or potential damage 
to the government. It is not meant to be exhaustive, but a sample of some of the most 
publicized cases.  
The second research activity conducted to answer the question of how online 
activity by insider threats has changed over time was to review public data of security 
clearance decision appeals from the Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals (DOHA). 
DOHA publishes case summaries for all industrial (contractor) security clearance 
appeals, 24 which are the result of negative security clearance decisions by the various 
Department of Defense (DoD) components as well as 20 other federal departments and 
agencies.25  Therefore this data represents the security clearance cases that were 
originally denied, whether they were overturned on appeal or not. While limited in scope 
to industrial security clearance appellants, it is the only public resource that shows the 
results of agency security clearance determinations, and provides a snapshot of at least 
one group of federal departments’ clearance adjudication efforts. This data was analyzed 
to identify how many cases were based on the adjudicative guideline that addresses the 
use of information technology systems. The same five year period was selected as for the 
insider threat case studies, with 2012 numerical data collected as of October 1 and 
projected for the rest of the year for the purpose of this research. By doing this, this thesis 
sought to identify whether the government was seeing an increase, decrease, or no change 
in the number of security clearances it was denying based on computer misuse. An 
increase was expected as these security clearance applicants would logically come from 
the general population which is increasing its use of computers and the Internet. This 
expectation is based on an assumption that the ratio of IT use to misuse is essentially 
constant. 
The third research question asks what impacts emerging technologies have on the 
ability of the adjudicative guidelines to mitigate insider threat. To answer this question, 
                                                 
24 Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals, “Industrial Security Clearance Decisions,” 
http://www.dod.mil/dodgc/doha/industrial/ (Accessed October 29, 2012). 
25 Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals, “Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals,” 
http://www.dod.mil/dodgc/doha/ (Accessed October 29, 2012). 
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the list of online behaviors was compared with the most recent version of the adjudicative 
guidelines. For each online behavior, the guidelines were reviewed to identify what 
guideline and disqualifying paragraph could apply. The guideline paragraph number was 
recorded for any behaviors that could be addressed by an adjudicative guideline. If more 
than one guideline could apply, multiple paragraph numbers were recorded. This exercise 
was completed for all behaviors on the list, and it identified those online behaviors that 
were covered by the adjudicative guidelines and those that were not. Appendix B 
includes this information in detail, as well as which of the insider threat cases are publicly 
reported to have engaged in each behavior. This thesis then discusses these uncovered 
behaviors and potential instances where they could be damaging to the government, 
display poor judgment, or indicate an inability to safeguard sensitive information.  
The fourth research question asks how the adjudicative guidelines can address the 
impacts of insider threats and provide agencies with the tools to do so. To answer this 
question, this thesis started with the behaviors that met the two criteria identified above in 
the third research question, i.e. those behaviors that were identified as not covered by the 
present adjudicative guidelines and that could reasonably case damage or indicate a 
potential for future damage. Such behaviors may suggest more research and consideration 
by the personnel security community, as there may be reason to include them as 
disqualifying in future versions of the adjudicative guidelines. These behaviors were then 
compared to the adjudicative guidelines to identify which existing guidelines could be 
modified to include them, or if no appropriate guideline presently exists, to suggest the 
creation of new guidelines to do so. A set of recommendations for improving the current 
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IV. DATA FROM PUBLICLY AVAILABLE CASE STUDIES AND 
DOHA 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter includes data from real-world cases of insider threat, as shown in 
summaries of public cases of insider threat as well as a statistical analysis of clearance 
denial cases from the Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals (DOHA). These two 
overarching sources are examined in this chapter because they are the only two ways to 
observe what is going on in the workforce in terms of information systems use. For the 
case studies section, special attention will be placed on what systems use was engaged in, 
such as email, file sharing, online gaming, or other activities. For the section on clearance 
denial cases, the emphasis will be on tallying those cases where a security clearance was 
denied at least initially based on misuse of information technology systems. This data 
will be examined from the past five years. If the general population is becoming more 
familiar with information technology, then over time both data sources should expect to 
show increases as well. Insider threat cases should have an increasing range of 
information systems activity, and there should be an increase in the proportion of security 
clearance denials based on information systems misuse.  
B. CASE STUDIES 
1. 2008: Gregg Bergersen 
On February 11, 2008, a Chinese spy ring was broken up with arrests of Gregg 
William Bergersen and Tai Shen Kuo, along with another individual on espionage 
charges related to the passage of classified U.S. government documents and information 
to the government of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Bergersen lived in 
Alexandria, Virginia, and worked for the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) 
as a weapons system policy analyst.26 The DSCA is responsible for U.S. arms sales to 
foreign nations. Bergersen reportedly also held a Top Secret security clearance. 
                                                 
26 Department of Justice, “Defense Department Official and Two Others Arrested on Espionage 
Charges Involving China,” February. 11, 2008, 
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2008/February/08_nsd_105.html.  
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Previously, he was the director of the Navy’s command, control, communications and 
intelligence office.27 In July 2008, he was sentenced to 57 months in prison.28 According 
to the Federal Bureau of Prisons, he was released in November 2011.29    
Kuo, a Taiwan-born U.S. citizen, was arrested in New Orleans along with another 
individual, who was passing information Kuo received from Bergersen on to a Chinese 
intelligence officer in Beijing. On some occasions, Bergersen received undetermined cash 
payments from Kuo in exchange for information and documents he provided.30  Kuo is 
reported to have received $50,000 from the Chinese government for his recruitment 
efforts.31  He pled guilty in May 2008 and was sentenced to 16 years in prison. Later, his 
sentence was reduced to five years, most likely as a result of his cooperation with the 
U.S. government.32  Kuo was released from prison in June 2012.33     
2. 2009: James Fondren  
Subsequent to the arrests of Bergersen and Kuo, a retired Air Force officer and 
civilian pentagon employee with a Top Secret clearance, James W. Fondren, Jr., was 
arrested in May 2009 on espionage charges relating to his dealings with Tai Shen Kuo. 
He was charged with one count of conspiracy to communicate classified information to 
an agent of a foreign government, four counts of unlawfully communicating classified 
information to an agent of a foreign government, and three counts of making false 
                                                 
27 “4 Arrests in China Spy Cases,” Washington Times, February. 12, 2008, 
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2008/feb/12/4-arrests-in-china-spy-cases/?page=all#pagebreak. 
28 Neil A. Lewis, “Former Analyst Sentenced to Prison in Chinese Spy Case,” New York Times, July 
12, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/12/washington/12spy.html.  
29 Federal Bureau of Prisons, “Gregg Bergersen,” Inmate Locator, 
http://www.bop.gov/iloc2/InmateFinderServlet?Transaction=NameSearch&needingMoreList=false&FirstN
ame=gregg&Middle=&LastName=bergersen&Race=U&Sex=U&Age=&x=0&y=0 (Accessed July 15, 
2012). 
30 Department of Justice, “Defense Department Official and Two Others Arrested on Espionage 
Charges Involving China.”  
31 Department of Energy, Counterintelligence Richland Field Office, “James W. Fondren, Jr.,” 
http://www.hanford.gov/c.cfm/oci/ci_spy.cfm?dossier=149.  
32 “Judge Cuts Sentence of Louisiana Man who Spied for China,” Associated Press, June 25, 2010, 
http://www.nola.com/crime/index.ssf/2010/06/judge_cuts_sentence_of_louisia.html.  
33 Federal Bureau of Prisons, “Tai Kuo,” Inmate Locator, 
http://www.bop.gov/iloc2/InmateFinderServlet?Transaction=NameSearch&needingMoreList=false&FirstN
ame=tai&Middle=&LastName=kuo&Race=U&Sex=U&Age=&x=0&y=0 (Accessed July 15, 2012). 
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statements to the FBI.34  Like Bergersen, Fondren had passed sensitive information to 
Kuo over a span of years. Fondren wrote “opinion papers” for Kuo that were often thinly 
veiled regurgitations of classified military reports. Fondren received $800 to $1,500 for 
each of these reports, which Kuo then relayed to an intelligence officer in China.35  
Fondren was convicted and sentenced on January 22, 2010 to three years in prison36 and 
is currently still incarcerated.37   
3. 2009: Stewart Nozette 
Stewart David Nozette was arrested on October 19, 2009, on charges of 
espionage. Nozette had earned a PhD from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology in 
1983, and later worked for the Department of Energy, the Department of Defense, the 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration and the White House’s National Space 
Council. He had held a Top Secret clearance with access to SCI. On September 7, 2010, 
he pleaded guilty to attempted espionage for providing classified information to a person 
he believed to be an Israeli intelligence officer.38   
Nozette had previously pleaded guilty to other charges of conspiracy to defraud 
the U.S. government with respect to false claims and tax evasion in January 2009, and 
ultimately agreed to pay restitution to the government of $265,205. During that 
investigation in February 2007, the FBI searched Nozette’s home in Maryland and found 
classified documents. They later discovered that in 2002, Nozette sent an email 
threatening to sell classified information to Israel or another foreign government. As a 
result, the FBI opened an undercover operation unrelated to the original fraud case, which 
resulted in the subsequent espionage charges and conviction. Nozette was contacted 
                                                 
34 Department of Energy, Counterintelligence Richland Field Office, “James W. Fondren, Jr.” 
35 “Retired AF Officer on Trial in China Spy Case,” Associated Press, September 22, 2009, 
http://www.airforcetimes.com/news/2009/09/airforce_spy_case_092209w.  
36 Department of Energy, Counterintelligence Richland Field Office, “James W. Fondren, Jr.” 
37 Federal Bureau of Prisons, “James Fondren,” Inmate Locator, 
http://www.bop.gov/iloc2/InmateFinderServlet?Transaction=NameSearch&needingMoreList=false&FirstN
ame=james&Middle=&LastName=fondren&Race=U&Sex=M&Age=&x=31&y=15 (Accessed July 15, 
2012). 
38 Department of Justice, “Noted Scientist Pleads Guilty to Attempted Espionage,” September 7, 
2011, http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2011/September/11-nsd-1142.html.  
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beginning in September 2009 by undercover agents posing as Israeli intelligence officers. 
Through a series of meetings and dead drops, Nozette passed classified information on 
three occasions to what he thought was Israeli intelligence. His statements during the 
investigation indicated he knew the documents were classified, and that he believed his 
contacts to be from Israeli intelligence.39  Nozette was sentenced to 13 years in prison40 
and is currently incarcerated in Indiana.41 
4. 2009: Nidal Hasan 
On November 5, 2009, Army Major Nidal Hasan opened fire at Fort Hood, killing 
13 people and wounding 43 others.42  A review of his personal and professional life up to 
that point reveals a number of activities and associations of interest. He entered the U.S. 
Army in the late 1980s, and after attending college, he was commissioned as a medical 
officer in 1997. During his medical training, his radicalization was “on full display to his 
superiors and colleagues.”43  In 2001, his mother died and the family held her funeral at 
the Dar al Hijrah mosque in Falls Church, Virginia. Anwar al-Awlaki was an imam, or 
religious leader, of the mosque at that time. It is unclear if Hasan personally 
communicated with Awlaki then,44 though Hasan references meeting Awlaki in later 
email correspondence.45  Sometime around March 2006, Hasan posted an opening online 
for an imam at the Walter Reed Army Medical Center, which disclosed his personal 
                                                 
39 Department of Justice, “Noted Scientist Pleads Guilty to Attempted Espionage.”  
40 Del Quentin Wilber, “Maryland Scientist Stewart Nozette Sentenced for Passing Secrets to 
Supposed Mossad Agent, Expresses Regret,” Washington Post, March 31, 2012, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/crime-scene/post/maryland-scientist-stewart-nozette-sentenced-for-
passing-secrets-to-mossad-expresses-regret/2012/03/21/gIQAPh52RS_blog.html.  
41 Federal Bureau of Prisons, “Stewart Nozette,” Inmate Locator, 
http://www.bop.gov/iloc2/InmateFinderServlet?Transaction=NameSearch&needingMoreList=false&FirstN
ame=stewart&Middle=&LastName=nozette&Race=U&Sex=U&Age=&x=0&y=0 (Accessed November 
14, 2012). 
42 Federal Bureau of Investigation, Final Report of the William H. Webster Commission on The 
Federal Bureau of Investigation, Counterterrorism Intelligence, and the Events at Fort Hood, Texas, on 
November 5, 2009, July 12, 2012, 62, http://www.fbi.gov/news/pressrel/press-releases/final-report-of-the-
william-h.-webster-commission.  
43 U.S. Senate, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, A Ticking Time Bomb, 8.  
44 “Milestones: Nidal Malik Hasan,” New York Times, November 7, 2009, 
http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2009/11/07/us/20091107-HASAN-TIMELINE.html.  
45 Federal Bureau of Investigation, Final Report of the William H. Webster Commission, 50. 
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identity, his military affiliation, and an official military email address.46  Starting in 
December 2008, however, Hasan was in regular email contact with Awlaki, which may 
have lasted until mid-2009 according to Awlaki himself. The first contact appears to have 
been through a “Contact the Sheikh” link on Awlaki’s website.47  They discussed topics 
such as the killing of American soldiers,48 as well as how Hasan could safely send money 
to support Awlaki.49  From publicly available reports, it is unclear if these emails were 
encrypted; however Awlaki is reported to have used encryption in at least some of his 
emails to followers.50  Hasan joined Awlaki’s website email list, and received numerous 
mass emails from Awlaki.51  Post-incident searches also revealed that Hasan had multiple 
personal email accounts and an instant messenger account.52  Although the FBI was 
aware of these emails, they did not notify the Army or Hasan’s superiors, an effort which 
could have provided a more complete picture of the threat posed by Hasan.53 In May 
2009, a blog post attributed to Hasan supported suicide bombings and compared them 
with acts by soldiers who use their own bodies to shield others from exploding shrapnel. 
In July 2009, he purchased a gun from a local shop in Killeen, Texas, outside of Fort 
Hood. On November 4, the day prior to the attack, Hasan began giving away his 
belongings to a neighbor.54  
As an Army officer, it was likely that he held a Secret security clearance, though 
no reports indicate that he accessed classified information or shared sensitive information 
with terrorist groups or foreign countries. While current reports do not describe the 
                                                 
46 Federal Bureau of Investigation, Final Report of the William H. Webster Commission, 65. 
47 Ibid., 41. 
48 “Al Jazeera Interview: Anwar al Awlaki Regarding Malik Nidal Hasan,” NEFA Foundation, 
December 23, 2009, http://www.nefafoundation.org/miscellaneous/NEFAal-Awlaki1209.pdf (Accessed 
July 15, 2012). 
49 Federal Bureau of Investigation, Final Report of the William H. Webster Commission, 54. 
50 Catherine Herridge, “American Cleric Used More than 60 Email Accounts to Reach Followers, 
Including Hasan,” Fox News, June 15, 2012, http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2012/06/14/al-awlaki-used-
dozens-email-accounts-to-reach-followers-including-hasan/.  
51 Federal Bureau of Investigation, Final Report of the William H. Webster Commission, 63. 
52 Ibid., 66. 
53 U.S. Senate. Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs. A Ticking Time Bomb, 8.  
54 “Milestones: Nidal Malik Hasan,” New York Times.  
 24 
information that was known to Army personnel security adjudicators, it is likely that they 
were also not aware of the full extent of the concern that Major Hassan posed to national 
security.  
5. 2009: Walter and Gwendolyn Myers 
On June 4, 2009, the FBI arrested Walter Kendall Myers and his wife, Gwendolyn 
Myers, on charges of serving as illegal agents of the Cuban government for nearly 30 
years and conspiring to provide classified U.S. information to the Cuban government.55  
Walter Myers earned a PhD from Johns Hopkins University,56 and began his work at the 
State Department in 1977 as a contract instructor at the Department’s Foreign Service 
Institute (FSI) in Arlington, Va. In 1978, he visited Cuba, and was later recruited by 
Cuban Intelligence along with his wife after his return to the United States. He was 
advised to seek a position within the State Department or CIA that had access to 
classified information. He received a Top Secret security clearance in 1985. From 1988 
to 1999, in addition to his FSI duties, he performed periodic work for the State 
Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR). In 1999, his clearance was 
upgraded to include access to SCI.57  He began working full-time at the INR and, from 
July 2001 until his retirement in October 2007, he was a senior European analyst, where 
he specialized in intelligence analysis on European matters and had daily access to 
classified information. The couple spent nearly 30 years providing sensitive and 
classified information to the Cuban government.  
In April 2009, the FBI conducted an undercover operation in which Walter Myers 
was contacted by an undercover agent posing as a Cuban intelligence officer. Over a 
series of meetings, Myers described how he and his wife had passed classified 
information, met with Cuban agents in the U.S. and overseas and received taskings from 
                                                 
55 Department of Justice, “Former State Department Official and Wife Arrested for Serving as Illegal 
Agents of Cuba for Nearly 30 Years,” June 5, 2009, http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2009/June/09-nsd-
554.html.  
56 Pete Yost, “Cuban Spies: Kendall Myers, Gwendolyn Myers Face Prison,” Huffington Post, July 
16, 2010, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/07/16/cuban-spies-kendall-myers_n_648683.html.  
57 Department of Justice, “Former State Department Official and Wife Arrested.”  
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Cuban intelligence over short-wave radio.58  Myers is also reported to have sent 
encrypted emails using Internet cafes,59  and agreed to pass information to the 
undercover agent using code words and encryption programs over email.60  Walter Myers 
pleaded guilty in November 2009, and was sentenced to life in prison on July 16, 2010. 
Gwendolyn Myers received five years and nine months.61 Both are presently 
incarcerated.62 
6. 2010: Bradley Manning 
In May 2010, Bradley Manning was arrested in Iraq on charges relating to the 
transfer of over 250,000 classified documents to Julian Assange, who then posted the 
documents for public view on a public website, WikiLeaks.63  Prior to his military 
service, Manning displayed instances of questionable conduct. He was fired from his job 
at a software start-up company in late 2005 or early 2006. The company co-founder 
explained that it was because of odd behavior, suspected drug use, trouble focusing on 
work, and difficulty communicating.64 In March 2006, the police were called when he 
threatened his stepmother with a knife in their home. He moved out shortly thereafter.65   
                                                 
58 Department of Justice, “Former State Department Official and Wife Arrested.”  
59 Yost, “Cuban Spies.”  
60 Department of Justice, “Former State Department Official and Wife Arrested.”  
61 Carol Cratty, “Former State Department Official Sentenced to Life for Spying for Cuba,” CNN, July 
16, 2010, http://articles.cnn.com/2010-07-16/justice/spy.couple.sentenced_1_kendall-myers-cuban-agents-
gwendolyn-steingraber-myers?_s=PM:CRIME.  
62 Federal Bureau of Prisons, “Walter Kendall Myers,” Inmate Locator,  
http://www.bop.gov/iloc2/InmateFinderServlet?Transaction=NameSearch&needingMoreList=false&FirstN
ame=walter&Middle=kendall&LastName=myers&Race=U&Sex=M&Age=&x=0&y=0 (Accessed 
November 14, 2012).; and Federal Bureau of Prisons, “Gwendolyn Steingra Myers,” Inmate Locator, 
http://www.bop.gov/iloc2/InmateFinderServlet?Transaction=NameSearch&needingMoreList=false&FirstN
ame=gwendolyn&Middle=&LastName=myers&Race=U&Sex=U&Age=&x=36&y=23 (Accessed 
November 14, 2012). 
63 Kevin Poulsen and Kim Zetter, “U.S. Intelligence Analyst Arrested in WikiLeaks Video Probe,” 
Wired, June 6, 2010, http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2010/06/leak/.  
64 Ellen Nakashima, “Bradley Manning is at the Center of the WikiLeaks Controversy. But Who is 
He?”  Washington Post, May 4, 2011, http://www.washingtonpost.com/lifestyle/magazine/who-is-
wikileaks-suspect-bradley-manning/2011/04/16/AFMwBmrF_story_4.html.  
65 Ibid.  
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Manning joined the Army in October 2007, graduated from intelligence analyst 
training, received a Top Secret clearance with SCI access, and was stationed at Fort 
Drum, NY. While there, his supervisor required him to seek mental health counseling due 
to showing signs of instability.66  Manning was almost left behind when his unit 
deployed due to supervisors’ perceptions that he posed a risk to himself or others. 
However, the unit was short on intelligence analysts and his behavior began to improve, 
so he accompanied his unit to Iraq in late 2009. After three months, he went home on 
leave, and confided in his romantic partner that he had acquired sensitive information and 
was considering passing it to WikiLeaks. Shortly after returning to Iraq in February 2010, 
WikiLeaks began posting documents that appeared to be leaked from inside the 
government. Not long after a classified video of a U.S. helicopter attack was posted on 
WikiLeaks, Manning emailed friends and was very interested in whether or not the video 
was getting any attention.67  Manning is also suspected of installing unauthorized 
software onto a classified computer network during this time period, which enabled him 
to gain unauthorized access to information that was later posted on WikiLeaks.68 
Manning is suspected of sharing hundreds of thousands of classified files with 
WikiLeaks,69 which exposed some of the inner workings of the U.S.-led wars in Iraq and 
Afghanistan as well as of international diplomacy. At the same time, however, U.S. 
Secretary of Defense Robert Gates downplayed the impact of the leaks, saying in a 
November 2010 press conference, “Is this embarrassing? Yes. Is it awkward? Yes. 
Consequences for U.S. foreign policy? I think fairly modest.”70 
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On May 7, 2010, Manning was found laying in a fetal position in a storage closet, 
and later punched a female coworker in the face. He was demoted due to the assault, and 
was assessed by the unit psychiatrist as having an “occupational problem and adjustment 
disorder with mixed disturbance of emotions and conduct.”71 The psychiatrist 
recommended that he be discharged from the Army. His weapon was disabled, and he 
was transferred to work in the supply room. Manning then sought media contacts through 
social networking sites and made contact with a known convicted hacker, and confided in 
him that he had obtained State Department cables and other sensitive information. That 
convicted hacker notified the FBI, a tip which eventually led to Manning’s arrest.  
7. 2012: Jeffrey Delisle  
In January 2012, a Canadian naval intelligence officer was arrested for passing 
classified information to Russia from July 2007 until the time of his arrest.72  The officer, 
Jeffrey Delisle, most likely held a Top Secret security clearance with access to codeword 
program information,73 similar to the U.S. SCI. According to one report, the volume of 
information disclosed by the breach was comparable to the volume of U.S. data loss to 
WikiLeaks.74  Delisle was charged with communicating information to a foreign entity 
that could harm national interests, a charge under a section of the Security of Information 
Act. This is the first time anyone has been charged under that section of the act.75 On 
October 10, 2012, he pleaded guilty to this charge as well as to criminal breach of trust.76  
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He is pending sentencing and could face life in prison.77  Sources in the case initially said 
that Delisle was motivated by money,78 but later reports showed that he had marital 
issues and wrestled with thoughts of suicide. Once he began working for the Russians, he 
received $3,000 monthly and also became fearful for his children’s safety if he did not 
cooperate.79     
Additionally, Delisle is reported by his ex-wife to be an excessive computer user, 
Internet gamer, and collector of medieval fantasy gear. He is said to have admitted to 
having a computer addiction. A Canadian newspaper quotes her as saying, ““He played a 
lot of games like Ultimate Online, World of Warcraft, and Star Wars, and he actually let 
our kids play a lot of video games like that too.”80 She also said that Delisle would spend 
large amounts of money in the games, such as purchasing a virtual sword for hundreds of 
dollars. He made online posts indicating that he was interested in making friends in the 
virtual gaming communities. He also is reported to have made purchases on eBay for 
real-life medieval clothing such as chain mail, as well as intelligence-themed 
memorabilia associated with the CIA and DIA.81 Delisle used email to communicate with 
his Russian handlers,82 and appears to have used at least one social networking 
platform.83  A published analysis of his computer showed that he used removable media 
including floppy drives and USB drives, and also employed special software84 designed 
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to fully erase disk contents by overwriting them.85 The full extent of his online and 
virtual activities, including whether or not he made contacts or passed information to 
foreign agents using such avenues, is not yet known. It is possible that as the case 
continues, more information will be publicly disclosed. 
C. DATA FROM CASE STUDIES 
As shown in Appendix B, this study examined case studies and identified forms 
of online behavior each individual engaged in using a list of online behaviors or 
activities. For each activity as identified in news articles on Internet searches, a tally was 
placed in the matrix. The total tally for each case is shown at the bottom of the matrix in 
Appendix B. The tallies for each case are shown in Figure 1, Online Activities by Case 
over Time. As the trend line shows, the number has increased over time, with Bradley 
Manning displaying an unusually high engagement in online activities. Jeffrey Delisle is 
reported to have engaged in an elevated number of online activities, and as the case 
develops there may be additional activities uncovered. It appears tentatively that in 




Figure 1.   Number of Internet Activities in Case Studies Over Time   
                                                 
85 Communications Security Establishment Canada, “Entrust TrueDelete Version 4.0 for Win95/NT,” 
September 13, 2012, http://www.cse-cst.gc.ca/its-sti/services/cc/truedelete-v40-eng.html.  
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D. DATA FROM THE DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS 
As previously discussed, the office responsible all for security clearance appeals 
for contractors in the Department of Defense, as well as for 20 other federal departments 
and agencies, is the Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals (DOHA). This section 
includes a numerical tally of all DOHA cases that were denied under the personnel 
security adjudicative guideline, Misuse of Information Technology Systems, also known 
as Guideline M. The tally was then calculated as a percentage of the total cases, so that a 
proportion could be identified. The same five year period was selected as for the insider 
threat case studies. Over time, this proportion should increase as more and more 
applicants for security clearances would be more familiar with information systems.  
In contrast to the previously-identified trend of increasing online activity, the tally 
of DOHA cases that used the Use of Information Technology Systems guideline actually 
stayed the same or decreased over the same time period. The number of cases in which 
the guideline for Use of Information Technology Systems was applied was 21 in 2008, 25 
in 2009, 22 in 2010, 21 in 2011, and is projected to be 17 in 2012 (see Figure 2). Even 
when compared to the overall number of cases adjudicated by DOHA under all 
guidelines, the trend remains essentially flat. Given annual totals for the same years of 
1647, 1540, 1514, 1516, and 1208 (projected), the respective percentages of cases which 
DOHA applies the Use of Information Technology Systems guideline is 1.28%, 1.62%, 
1.45%, 1.39%, and 1.41% (see Figure 3).  
 
 
Figure 2.   Number of DOHA Clearance Denial Cases for Use of IT Systems over 
Time   
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Figure 3.   DOHA Clearance Denial Cases for Use of IT Systems as a Percentage of 
Total Cases over Time   
It is unclear why there are diverging trends in these two measures of online 
activity. If individuals are generally becoming more connected to the Internet and have an 
increasing virtual presence, then it could be expected that the number of DOHA cases 
where individuals misused IT systems would also increase proportionally. The cleared 
and applicant populations may simply be engaging in fewer disqualifying behaviors over 
time, or more aware of what behaviors could disqualify them from obtaining a security 
clearance. If this is not the case, however, the difference in trends may have implications 
for the effectiveness of the present personnel security background investigation process 
which largely does not account for online searches of applicants, also known as 
cybervetting. Presently the standard OPM background investigations that are conducted 
in support of security clearance adjudications do not include even a cursory name search 
on a public search engine. One hypothesis for this difference could be that without an 
effective means to check online activity, the investigation process is catching less and 
less of the derogatory information available on a given applicant. So as our insider threat 
cases show increased online activity, the ability of those agencies and departments served 
by DOHA to identify related cases is proportionately decreasing. This hypothesis 
suggests an avenue for future research that will be discussed later in this study. A 
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corollary to this hypothesis is that if the government can begin to incorporate 
cybervetting into its background investigations, it will result in an increase in security 
clearance denial cases based on the Use of Information Technology guideline. 
E. SUMMARY 
The above two sections, Case Studies and Data from DOHA both show trends 
that may be significant for the personnel security community. The trend among case 
studies is that the variety of use of information systems by insider threats has increased 
over the past five years. The other trend is that security clearance denial cases brought to 
DOHA have generally been steady, showing no corresponding increase in the number of 
cases over the past five years. After an increase in 2009, the proportion of denials based 
on IT systems misuse has actually decreased over time. A lack of effective cybervetting 
was proposed as one potential explanation for this divergence, but there could be other 
reasons as well and future research is needed. This divergence could mean that the 
government is increasingly vulnerable to IT systems misuse, although it should be noted 
that the impact of such misuse can be difficult or impossible to measure, especially in the 
public domain. For example, even in the cases of Manning and Delisle, where hundreds 
of thousands of classified documents were exfiltrated from classified systems, there has 
been no public evidence of deaths, injuries, or failed military missions that resulted. Even 
the degree of diplomatic difficulties that the foreign policy community has encountered 




V. CYBER BEHAVIORS IN CASE STUDIES AND THE 
ADJUDICATIVE GUIDELINES 
This chapter focuses on the third research goal, which examines the impacts 
emerging technologies have on the ability of the adjudicative guidelines to mitigate 
insider threat. The list of online activities in Appendix B was compared with the 
disqualifying conditions of the adjudicative guidelines as identified in Appendix A. For 
each online or information systems behavior, the guidelines were reviewed to identify 
what guideline and disqualifying paragraph could apply. The guideline paragraph number 
was recorded for any behaviors that could be addressed by an adjudicative guideline. If 
more than one guideline could apply, multiple paragraph numbers were recorded. This 
exercise was completed for all behaviors on the list, identifying those online behaviors 
that were covered by the adjudicative guidelines and those that were not. Appendix B 
also includes which of the insider threat cases are publicly reported to have engaged in 
each behavior.  
A. ROUTINE AND SITUATIONAL USES 
This section is devoted to activities that by themselves may not represent a 
concern, but given other factors or contexts become problematic. Social uses of 
information technology such as email, text messages, or social networking are generally 
routine and benign, but become problematic when they enable a person to connect with 
foreign governments or terrorists, pass sensitive information, or have other negative 
consequences. Personal computer uses that are routine or social when done in private 
may not be appropriate or acceptable in the workplace. Additionally, lax information 
systems security habits such as not updating virus software or writing down passwords by 
themselves may be harmless without external threats that exploit them, such as malicious 
code or a foreign intelligence service. Beyond lax habits, there are activities proactively 
taken to circumvent security policies and measures, which could be problematic when 
done for malicious purposes.  
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1. Social and Routine Uses of the Internet 
This category includes behaviors that are widely engaged in by the public, as 
individuals use the Internet to connect with family and friends, and to meet new people. 
Examples of such routine or social uses include using email; posting to bulletin boards, 
web logs, or chat rooms; online gaming; online dating; using Voice over Internet Protocol 
(VoIP); using social media platforms; online shopping for real or virtual goods; or 
sending text messages. Other more sophisticated practices may also fall into this 
category, including using encryption on emails, advanced file overwrite software, or 
using IP proxies or routers without the user allowing their own computer to be used by 
others as a proxy or router. By themselves, these behaviors are routine and would not 
present an increased risk for adjudication of security clearance according to the 
Adjudicative Guidelines. However, they could facilitate or help to hide other 
disqualifying behavior. This could include making foreign contacts on a social 
networking site, communicating with terrorist groups using encrypted communications, 
or targeting a malware attack via a proxy server to mask an individual’s identity.  
Since 2008, social and routine use by the individuals in the examined case studies 
has increased. Bergersen, for example, is known publicly to have used email and 
encrypted communications prior to his arrest in 2008, while more recent cases have 
shown a wider array of social or routine use. Bradley Manning is reported to have used 
email, instant messaging, social network platforms, encrypted communications, and 
removable media devices, while Delisle is reported to have been part of virtual 
communities and made online purchases of real and virtual goods. It is also likely that 
someone with Delisle’s familiarity with the Internet and virtual worlds would have also 
been a regular user of email, instant messaging, and social networking platforms, and 
possibly familiar with the use of encrypted communications and proxy servers or routers. 
As the details of the case become clearer, more information on Delisle’s routine and 
social Internet use may become public.  
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2. Unauthorized Activities in the Workplace 
Employees in today’s workplaces are often given computers and access to the 
Internet to perform their duties. However, this can present opportunities for individuals to 
misuse these resources. This category of online behavior can include viewing 
inappropriate or unauthorized websites while at work, downloading large files on 
employer bandwidth, hosting or playing online games, misusing employer email 
accounts, using employer computers for personal business, or other computer-related 
misuse of employer time or resources. It should be noted that the intentional disclosure of 
classified information, while usually work-related in some way, will be discussed 
separately in a later section. Without knowing more about the specific rules of behavior 
in place for each of the case studies examined, it is difficult to identify the extent to 
which those individuals engaged in this category of activity. For example, unless the 
blogs and social networking sites that Bradley Manning used were specifically identified 
and banned by the Army, and unless he used a duty-only computer (as opposed to 
computers made available to soldiers for personal uses such as writing home or checking 
finances), he may not have engaged in activities covered in this section.  
While there is no specific guideline for employee misconduct (such as in the 
employment suitability regulation, 5 CFR 731, which include a disqualifying factor for 
“misconduct or negligence in employment”86), many of these examples could fall within 
the Personal Conduct adjudicative guideline. Specifically, online activities in the 
workplace, when in violation of written rules of behavior, could be disqualifying under 
section 16(e), if it constitutes “a pattern of dishonesty or rule violations, including 
violation of any written or recorded agreement made between the individual and the 
agency.” This language implies that more than one instance of a violation is needed in 
order to constitute a pattern, and that this only applies to employment with a federal 
agency and not in cases of rule violations while employed at a private company.  
 
                                                 
86 “Criteria for Making Suitability Determinations,” Code of Federal Regulations, Title 5, Pt. 731.202, 
Electronic Edition, http://ecfr.gpoaccess.gov/cgi/t/text/text-
idx?c=ecfr&rgn=div5&view=text&node=5:2.0.1.1.7&idno=5#5:2.0.1.1.7.2.1.2 (Accessed November 14, 
2012).  
 36 
3. Improper or Poor Information Systems Security Habits 
This category includes those behaviors that show a lack of adherence to widely-
accepted security practices, which could create vulnerabilities for an individual or those 
people, companies, or organizations the individual is associated with. This thesis 
organizes such habits into five categories: online browsing habits, email and messaging 
habits, password management, network connections, and system security. Each category 
has its own implications for personnel security and the adjudicative guidelines. None of 
the case studies that were examined show any specific indicators of lax security habits of 
individuals leading to damage to the national security, though it is possible in the 
Manning and Delisle cases that coworkers, supervisors, or network administrators failed 
to take steps that would have mitigated some of the vulnerabilities that were later 
exploited.   
Online browsing habits can include behaviors such as accepting invalid secure 
socket layer (SSL) certificates, clicking on unknown web links, downloading files or 
software from unknown or untrusted sources, purchasing goods from unknown sources, 
sharing personal or financial information with untrusted sources, or using unsecure 
connections. This kind of activity could leave a user unprotected or create vulnerabilities, 
but a review of the Adjudicative Guidelines shows no clearly applicable disqualifying 
factor. Email and messaging habits can include opening an email or attachment from an 
unknown sender, opening or responding to spam emails, sending personal or financial 
information to an unknown recipient. The Adjudicative Guidelines do not appear to cover 
this category, either. Lax password management can include using weak passwords for 
personal accounts, using the same password across multiple accounts, never changing a 
password, sharing passwords with others, not protecting passwords, or using simple or 
easily-guessed password recovery questions. Again, there are no clearly applicable 
adjudicative guidelines for this kind of behavior.   
Keeping network connections secure and using them properly protects individuals 
and information. Lax habits in this area could include connecting to unsecure wireless 
access points such as those found in airports or hotels, maintaining an open wireless 
router for personal use, or allowing a personal computer to serve as a proxy or exit point 
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for other unidentified users. In the Tor router network, for example, computers are 
voluntarily used in a series of IP address relays, with some computers voluntarily serving 
as exit points for Internet traffic. Thus the true identity of the user is concealed behind 
layers and layers of intermediary IP addresses with only the last address being visible to 
the target website. Such a network facilitates individuals in repressive countries to speak 
freely without facing political arrest, but can also facilitate criminal activity and hinder 
legitimate law enforcement investigation. This would be akin to an individual lending 
their vehicle to anyone else without question; doing this might help someone in need, but 
it also creates an obvious vulnerability that the vehicle could just as easily be used to 
facilitate an armed robbery or terrorist attack. Allowing a computer IP address to be used 
as such a relay exit point or proxy for other users not only makes the individual 
vulnerable to malicious actors, but could also facilitate criminal activity if their IP 
address is used by criminals to access illegal content or facilitate clandestine 
communications. In that case, Personal Conduct paragraph 16(g), “association with 
persons involved in criminal activity,” could apply.  
Lax system security behaviors include failing to install or update anti-virus or 
other security software, failing to update software with newer versions or patches, 
reducing browser security settings, synchronizing with unsecured mobile devices, using 
programs that allow remote or mobile access to a personal computer, or unintentionally 
installing unauthorized software onto an official or classified computer system. The last 
item may call for workplace counseling, and could become disqualifying under the 
Adjudicative Guidelines if the behavior continued despite that counseling. Specifically, 
paragraph 34(h) includes “negligence or lax security habits that persist despite counseling 
by management.”  Otherwise, these activities do not appear to be presently covered. The 
wording from paragraph 34(h) implies that the lax habits are only applicable to the 
workplace, or else management would not be in a position to provide counseling. It also 
implies that the behavior by itself is not disqualifying unless the individual is counseled; 
absent formal counseling, the individual can continue the behavior without consequence 
for their security clearance. Therefore, this discussion of lax security habits in an 
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individual’s nonprofessional life, and without training or counseling, does not have an 
impact on his or her security clearance under the present Adjudicative Guidelines.  
The examination of lax security habits raises a number of challenges for personnel 
security. It may be difficult to argue that an applicant should potentially be denied a 
security clearance because they don’t use a strong password on their home wireless 
router, or because they use the same password in multiple personal accounts. 
Furthermore, the ability to question or investigate these areas may be limited without 
requiring disclosure of personal account password information to security officials, a 
practice which may be inadvisable or even illegal. Such security habits may also be 
common enough to preclude taking unfavorable actions regarding a security clearance. 
As individuals are free to leave the doors to their homes unlocked, or walk alone at night, 
so too can individuals make choices with their personal online behavior that increase 
their vulnerability.  
On the other hand, this activity may be disqualifying under Personal Conduct 
paragraph 16(d), if it becomes “credible adverse information that is not explicitly covered 
under any other guideline… which… supports a whole-person assessment of 
questionable judgment… or other characteristics indicating that the person may not 
properly safeguard protected information.”  The key challenge for security clearances is 
to determine the line at which a lax security habit crosses from forgivable naiveté to 
unforgivable negligence that is significant and obvious to a reasonable person, as well as 
whether or not personnel security specialists need more specific guidance when deciding 
where to apply this line in case adjudications.   
4. Improper or Poor Operations Security (OPSEC) Habits  
This category includes behaviors and practices that could jeopardize the 
operational security of the user of the agency or company they work for. This could 
include giving too much personal detail such as social security numbers or full dates of 
birth on social networking sites, posting information that links the user to their employer, 
exposes the physical locations of company or agency worksites, discusses physical 
security posture or procedures, posting geographically tagged pictures with embedded 
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location coordinates, or posting operational information on resumes or job applications. 
Bradley Manning engaged in this type of activity when he discussed with an online 
associate who he had never met his work as an intelligence analyst, his access to 
classified information, and how his office had “weak servers, weak logging, weak 
physical security, weak counterintelligence, and inattentive signal analysis ... a perfect 
storm.”87   
Poor use of operational security could be considered under the Handling Protected 
Information paragraphs 34(a), (b), (c), and (h), but only if the operational data is 
considered “protected information.”  This is unclear, as the fact that an employee works 
for a certain agency, the grid coordinates or floor plan of an office, or the duty hours of 
the gate guards are likely not considered classified or official use only. Unless the 
information is considered as protected, this activity is not disqualifying under this 
guideline. The only other guideline that could be applied is the Personal Conduct 
paragraph 16(d) as it could constitute questionable judgment or an unwillingness to 
comply with rules and regulates, but only if the individual’s company or agency 
specifically outlines what information is allowed to be posted online or in social 
networking sites. 
B. FURTHERING ILLICIT ACTIVITIES 
As previously established, this paper has identified three main categories within 
which the list of cyber activities may fall. The first category contains uses of Internet 
technology to further other illicit activities. Specifically, this includes explicit or 
offensive activities, intentional disclosure of classified or sensitive information, the use of 
the Internet to commit crimes, employment of false identities, and engagement in 
bullying online behavior. Each of these areas will be briefly examined for its significance 
to the personnel security discipline as well as through an examination of case studies.  
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1. Explicit, Obscene, or Offensive Activities 
This category includes activities that a third party might deem inappropriate, 
obscene, or offensive. Examples include accessing extremist websites or online 
pornography, sending spam messages with offensive text or pictures, or sharing images 
of sexual activity or violence. Excluded from this category are activities engaged in at the 
workplace, which would be covered under the Unauthorized Activities in the Workplace 
category. A review of the publicly available information pertaining to the identified case 
studies shows no known engagement in such activity. While it may be highly likely the 
Nidal Hasan viewed Jihadist or other extremist websites or viewed or shared images of 
violent activity, this was not affirmatively supported in the case study research.  
Such obscene activities, when done on a personal computer away from the 
workplace, may not constitute illegal behavior and may be protected free speech. The 
present adjudicative guidelines do not address this kind of behavior unless it is conducted 
at the workplace or violates a law. In those cases, Personal Conduct paragraph 16(d)(2) 
and (4), or Criminal Conduct paragraph 31(a) and (c) could apply. 
2. Intentional Disclosure of Classified or Sensitive Information 
When classified or official use only information is knowingly shared with 
individuals without proper clearance and need to know, damage to national security can 
occur. Activity that involves such intentional disclosure can include emailing or instant 
messaging classified information with foreign nationals, downloading classified 
information to an unclassified system or network, sending classified or sensitive 
information to a website or blog, or posting classified information on an unclassified 
resume. Bradley Manning is the only case example that has engaged in such behavior. He 
is reported to have engaged in sending classified emails and instant messages to 
uncleared individuals and foreign nationals, downloading classified information to an 
unclassified system, and sending classified information to a website.  
The adjudicative guidelines appear to address this behavior very well. Handling 
Protected Information paragraphs 34(a), (b), (c), and (g) applied to almost all activities 
under this section, and paragraph 34(f) applied to some in addition. When classified or 
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sensitive information is disclosed to foreign nationals, Foreign Influence paragraph 7(a) 
and (b) also apply. Depending on the allegiances or intentions of the recipient, Allegiance 
to the United States paragraphs 4(b) and (c) could also apply. There were no example 
behaviors considered in this section that were not readily addressed in the adjudicative 
guidelines. 
3. Criminal Activity 
The Internet’s ability to connect individuals and networks makes it a key medium 
for both legal and illegal activity. Crimes can be more easily committed using the 
Internet, including the acquisition and sharing of illegal pornography, intellectual 
property, proprietary information, software licenses, stolen items, stolen identities, 
laundered money, or financial support to terrorism. The Internet can also facilitate crimes 
such as fraud, including toll fraud committed through phone “phreaking” tactics such as 
switch-hooking.88  The cases examined showed no known engagement in this kind of 
activity. By the nature of the activities included in this section, Criminal Conduct 
paragraphs 16(a) and (c) could apply to all activities. In cases where child pornography, 
encounters with minors, or prostitution are involved through online downloading or 
solicitation, Sexual Behavior paragraphs 13(a) and (c) could apply. Money laundering 
and financial support to terrorism (also known as reverse money laundering) could be 
addressed in Allegiance to the United States paragraph 4(a), (b), and (c). If there is a 
foreign nexus to any of the activity, Foreign Influence paragraphs 7(a), (b), and (g) could 
also apply.  
4. Use of False or Misleading Identities 
This category can include the use of misleading or false identities online, such as 
participating in a chat room or group with a fake identity, creating misleading email 
accounts, using another person’s accounts or passwords, falsifying online resumes, or 
associating oneself with a company or organization that he or she is not a part of. 
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Additionally, this category could include more technical misrepresentation such as 
spoofing email addresses or altering email headers to appear to come from another person 
or IP address. For the purposes of this research, case studies were reviewed for examples 
of deliberate falsification rather than simply anonymizing one’s identity instead of using 
the user’s real name, which could be interpreted as a best practice for personal safety on 
the Internet. None of the cases examined showed deliberate falsification or use of another 
person’s identity, though Manning and Delisle used anonymous screen names to 
communicate, and it is likely that Nidal Hasan did so as well.  
The adjudicative guidelines do not explicitly address the use of false identities, 
other than when engaged in during a background investigation, hiring process, or other 
official personnel or security process. A pattern of dishonesty or rule violations in the 
workplace could be disqualifying, but this appears to be limited to the workplace. It is 
possible to interpret Personal Conduct paragraph 16(d) to include “untrustworthiness” as 
part of a whole-person assessment that disqualifies the applicant, but this may not be 
clear. The example of falsifying a resume would likely be included in this paragraph, but 
other uses of false identities online are not clearly disqualifying. The only other 
applicable guideline is Criminal Conduct paragraphs 31(a) and (c) if the false identity 
violated the law, such as in the case of fraud. However, it may not always be readily 
apparent when a given behavior crosses this line. 
5. Bullying, Intimidating, or Threatening Behavior 
Online activity that is hurtful or threatening to a person or group of persons can 
include hosting a website or making online comments to damage an employer or its 
employees, posting hurtful information or pictures of someone without their permission, 
or harassing or bullying someone online. Nidal Hasan is reported to have communicated 
with Anwar al Awlaki to discuss killing American soldiers, and is also reported to have 
made a blog posting about suicide bombers. Bradley Manning facilitated the posting of 
information that was damaging not only to the United States government, but to foreign 
diplomats and other leaders whose private deliberations were made public. In the wake of 
the WikiLeaks disclosure and during the Occupy Wall Street protests in Fall 2011, some 
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hacker groups such as Anonymous engaged in menacing behavior by posting personal 
information of targeted individuals and their family members online, a practice referred 
to as “doxing.”89 While this personal information was publicly available in various places 
on the Internet such as white pages or social networking profiles, it was collected and 
posted in a “dox,” such a way that suggested the targeted individual could be harassed or 
bullied by anyone wishing to do so.  
Unless the menacing behavior violates the law, the adjudicative guidelines do not 
address it. When criminal, Criminal Conduct paragraphs 16(a) and (c) could apply. One 
example of such behavior could be “swatting,” a term used to describe when a person 
calls for emergency services to false emergencies in order to disrupt legitimate services, 
waste government resources, and put innocent victims and responders at risk, often by 
using software programs that hide the caller’s true identity and location. This kind of 
menacing activity is widely illegal, and a number of violators have been convicted and 
received jail sentences.90  If a person’s sensitive information such as social security 
number are revealed in the course of the behavior, it could be included under Handling 
Protected Information paragraph 34(a) and (b); it is not readily clear, however, if this 
kind of information is included as “protected” as it is not considered classified or for 
official use only, or other category of government protection. It is likely, however, the 
individual whose social security number is exposed, would consider it protected and not 
authorized for public disclosure.  
C. USES OF TECHNOLOGY SPECIFIC TO THE INTERNET 
The third section of this thesis includes the malicious uses of technology that are 
specific to the Internet. These are activities that involve, take place within, and directly 
impact the information technology environment. These activities are not routine or social 
uses, and are not in furtherance of traditional activities, but are themselves dependent on 
the technology itself. That is, there could be no unauthorized access to information 
                                                 
89 Steve Ragan, “The FBI’s Warning about Doxing was Too Little Too Late,” Tech Herald, December 
19, 2011, http://www.thetechherald.com/articles/The-FBIs-warning-about-doxing-was-too-little-too-late.  
90 Michael Cooney, “FBI Warns Emergency 911 Swatters are a Growing Menace,” Network World, 
February 5, 2008, http://www.networkworld.com/community/node/24714.  
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systems or network sabotage without the existence of the information systems and 
networks in the first place. What follows is a discussion of each of those categories.  
1. Gaining Unauthorized Access and Bypassing Security  
Activities in this category include hacking or other means to gain unauthorized 
access to information systems or networks. Some examples include hacking into another 
person’s email account, obtaining account passwords using social engineering, spyware, 
or keylogger software, installing software that facilitates unauthorized access, using 
administrator or other “back door” entry points without permission, or using one system 
to help gain access to another system in an unauthorized manner. Bradley Manning is 
accused of hacking into government computer systems by using unauthorized software to 
gain access to classified information that he otherwise was not authorized to access. No 
other case studies showed that the individuals in question had obtained unauthorized 
access. 
The adjudicative guidelines are generally very thorough in their coverage of this 
category of activity. Use of Information Technology Systems paragraphs 40(a), (c), (e), 
and (f) are commonly applicable, and paragraph 40(b) and (d) were also applicable to 
some activities. Manning’s activity is specifically disqualifying under 40(c) and (f) as the 
use of an information technology system to gain unauthorized access to another system, 
and the introduction of software onto a system without authorization. Activities in this 
category that had no applicable adjudicative guideline included port scanning and 
network reconnaissance, visiting hacker websites to learn techniques, and researching 
system or network vulnerabilities. These activities, while concerning, are not 
disqualifying under any guidelines unless an individual takes further malicious actions as 
a result of this research, or there are explicit workplace rules that prohibit the activity.  
This category also includes the intentional bypassing of security measures, such 
as using unauthorized proxy servers; lowering security settings on an Internet browser; 
and disabling firewalls, anti-virus software, event logging, or other security safeguards. 
Public information on the examined case studies showed no confirmed engagement in 
this type of conduct. The adjudicative guidelines do address this under Use of 
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Information Technology Systems paragraphs 40(b) and (g), which include unauthorized 
modification of system software, and negligence or lax security habits.  
2. Computer Network Sabotage 
Activities included in this category have the intent of injuring or attacking 
websites, software, hardware, or the smooth operation of the Internet or local networks. 
Examples include making changes to a website, conducting denial of service attacks on 
websites, using botnets, releasing malicious code such as worms, viruses, or Trojans, 
using malware to damage or destroy a system, or otherwise sabotaging a computer or 
network. Related to these activities is the sharing of network security information with a 
hacker group or other individuals with the explicit or implicit understanding that it could 
result in similar damage. None of the case studies showed this form of behavior; the 
individuals may have been more interested in exploiting their networks than simply 
bringing them down. 
The Use of Information Technology Systems guideline, especially paragraphs 
40(a) and (b) are applicable to most of this activity. In the cases of introduction of 
hardware or software onto a system, 40(f) also applies. The transmission of network 
information to a hacker group is not included in the Use of Information Technology 
Systems guideline, but could be applicable under Handling Protected Information, 
paragraph 34(a). The only activity without an applicable guideline is the setting up of 
fake accounts on a website in order to clog its customer list. This may not be illegal, and 
does not require unauthorized access to any system. However, it would arguably take 
more effort to set up such accounts than it would be to identify and delete them, leading 
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VI. DISCUSSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
This chapter will discuss the previous information and its implications for the 
personnel security adjudicative guidelines, and provide specific recommendations for 
enhancement. It reviews the current state of personnel security by assessing how the 
online behaviors compared to the adjudicative guidelines. This includes which guidelines 
were generally well covered, partially covered, or not covered. Given that assessment, the 
section proceeds to describe recommended changes to the adjudicative guidelines in 
order to address those areas assessed as partially covered or not covered. By making 
these changes, the personnel security community may be better able to mitigate insider 
risks such as espionage or terrorism involving cleared personnel. This chapter also 
includes a discussion of the limitations of this research, followed by this thesis’ 
concluding comments. 
A. THE CURRENT STATE OF SECURITY 
Of the eleven categories of online behavior contained in the list developed by this 
study, the present adjudicative guidelines effectively address four, and mostly address 
one, but do not address the remaining six. As shown in Appendix B, there is widespread 
coverage of at least one adjudicative guideline paragraph in the categories of 
unauthorized workplace use, intentional disclosure of sensitive information, use of the 
Internet to commit other crimes, and use of the Internet to commit network sabotage. The 
present personnel security adjudicative guidelines appear to provide sufficient and clear 
tools for agencies to disqualify individuals engaged in these forms of online activity. 
One category has significant coverage but with three specific activities that are 
not addressed. In the unauthorized access and bypassing security category, conducting 
vulnerability research on networks, port scanning and network reconnaissance, and 
visiting hacker websites in preparation of hacking were not addressed by the guidelines, 
as they were not illegal or actively destructive in nature. This activity may be concerning, 
however, as it may show a malicious intent to damage network systems. It may be 
possible that an individual engaged in this activity may be at a heightened risk of 
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engaging in more serious, damaging, or criminal activity in the future and may be less 
inclined to protect classified or sensitive information in the workplace.  
The guidelines do not address six of the categories of online use, including social 
use, lax security habits, operations security, obscene activity, false identities, and 
menacing behavior. In reviewing the categories that are contained in the social or routine 
use section, it is likely that most if not all of the activity in the social use and obscene 
activity categories could be considered free speech and is engaged in by significant 
portions of the population. It is unclear what, if any, effort could be undertaken in the 
adjudicative guidelines to address this activity. The remaining categories may suggest 
additional discussion. 
Lax security habits include activity such as following unknown links in emails, 
downloading files from untrusted sources, and other legal but unsafe personal computing 
habits. The present adjudicative guidelines do not address these behaviors, but they could 
be harmful to employees’ personal computers or information. They could potentially put 
an individual at risk for blackmail or coercion as malicious actors could obtain their 
personal information more easily from such vulnerabilities. It also may show poor 
judgment or lack of familiarity with the Internet or online communications, which in 
today’s world could be a concern relating to a person’s ability to safeguard classified or 
sensitive information. A similar concern is present in the operations security category, as 
individuals who are posting locations, building layouts, or pictures that contain grid 
coordinates may be inadvertently helping a malicious actor to damage the government’s 
assets or operations, and may show poor judgment in protecting sensitive information.  
The guidelines also do not account for the use of false identities unless they are 
used for fraud or other crime, or are related to employment or background investigations. 
The use of the Internet provides increasing opportunities for people to misrepresent 
themselves, so this could be more of an issue as technology develops. Lastly, the 
guidelines do not address menacing online behavior unless it becomes criminal or 
involves the publishing of sensitive information. This means that malicious doxing, 
cyberbullying or other harassment, or spreading false rumors about a person is not readily 
addressed. These behaviors may be concerning in light of the responsibility, public 
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exposure, and trust placed in applicants for security clearances. Individuals engaging in 
this type of behavior may use their increased access to expose even more personal 
information about others or increase the effectiveness and reach of their intimidation or 
harassment efforts. Public knowledge that an individual with a history of such behavior 
was hired and granted a security clearance may also be embarrassing for the agency or 
company. Presently the adjudicative guidelines only address false information if it relates 
to the background investigation or hiring process, and not in other areas of a person’s life. 
The guidelines also do not address non-criminal activity, and in the world of online 
bullying the line between pointing out a person’s physical flaws or fabricating a sexual 
encounter and criminal harassment may be a grey area not explicitly addressed. 
B. RECOMMENDED UPDATES TO ADJUDICATIVE GUIDELINES 
Given the above discussion of the categories of online activity and the adequacy 
of the personnel security adjudicative guidelines, there are implications for several 
existing guidelines as well as one potential new guideline. This section will discuss the 
implications for each guideline. 
1. Foreign Influence 
Foreign influence was identified as a guideline that could apply to the intentional 
disclosure of sensitive information to foreign nationals as this could be a contact that 
creates a heightened risk for foreign exploitation or be a connection that creates a conflict 
of interest between the individual’s obligation to protect sensitive information and their 
desire to help their foreign associate. The definition of “contact” or “connection” may be 
evolving with the expanding numbers of relationships individuals can form on the 
Internet, as may be the word “association,” which is also used in paragraphs 7(f) and (g). 
Inclusion of more specific language may help clarify this guideline. This guideline may 
benefit from more specific guidance regarding which associations are disqualifying in the 
online world, such as being friends with a foreign national on a social networking site.  
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2. Financial Considerations 
While no online activity examined was addressed using the Financial 
Considerations guideline, the case studies reiterated the importance of this guideline in 
addressing insider threat cases. Derogatory information under the Financial 
Considerations guideline was found in the case study reviews of Jeffrey Delisle, who may 
have needed money to fund his online gaming and other purchases by selling information 
to the Russian government; Gregg Bergersen and James Fondren received money from 
the Chinese government for their sensitive information, though it is unclear if they were 
experiencing financial difficulties; and Stuart Nozette had previously been convicted of 
tax evasion charges and owed the government more than $260,000 dollars. This guideline 
continues to be important in identifying and mitigating insider threat. However, the 
Delisle case information may suggest an area for strengthening the Financial 
Considerations guideline by adding language that includes debts due to excessive online 
gaming excessive participation in virtual worlds, or excessive use of virtual currency.  
3. Personal Conduct 
The Personal Conduct guideline had frequent application in the unauthorized 
workplace use and furtherance of criminal activity categories. There were other areas in 
which it may have been applicable if those areas included activity at the workplace or the 
conduct of a background investigation. The guideline covers behavior that could raise 
questions about an individual’s judgment, trustworthiness, or reliability, as well as 
behavior that could be disruptive, violent, or otherwise inappropriate in the workplace. 
By expanding the language in this guideline to explicitly include all false or purposely 
misleading information, as well as disruptive, violent or other inappropriate behavior, the 
guideline could address these activities. The use of false online identities or the spreading 
of false or misleading information about oneself or others outside of the workplace or 
background investigation realms, as well as the many forms of cyberbullying and 
malicious rumor-spreading online could be addressed. Doxing is another potentially 
concerning behavior that would be covered under broader language in the Personal 
Conduct guideline regarding disruptive, violent, or inappropriate behavior. This is 
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especially true of those behaviors that may not obviously be criminal in nature but could 
otherwise be damaging or malicious to others and raise doubts about trustworthiness,  or 
the ability to safeguard sensitive information.  
4. Handling Protected Information 
As in the previous discussion of the Personal Conduct guideline, doxing is a 
behavior that could also be addressed in the Handling Protected Information guideline. 
Presently the guideline does not explicitly define what sensitive or protected information 
is. A government official’s personal information such as home address, home phone 
number, or those of her children or other family members are not likely to be considered 
sensitive or protected. But when an individual collects and posts this information online 
in a manner that encourages harassment or even physical harm, that individual may be 
engaging in behavior that indicates poor judgment, lack of respect for the government, or 
an unwillingness to protect other sensitive information. This concern is elevated further if 
the dox contains dates of birth, social security numbers, or other non-public information, 
which could be considered even more sensitive in nature but not necessarily covered by 
this guideline. Whether they specifically include personal information as protected and 
thus its disclosure as potentially disqualifying, the guidelines could be more explicit in 
how they define what is sensitive or protected. 
5. Use of Information Technology Systems 
As previously identified, the Use of Information Technology Systems guideline 
has significant coverage of online behaviors but with one gap. Conducting vulnerability 
research, network reconnaissance, and visiting hacker websites were not addressed in the 
guideline, but may show intent to damage networks or indicate a heightened insider risk 
of future attacks. Should a subsequent attack actually take place, it may be difficult for a 
government agency to explain their failure to conduct additional background 
investigation or confront the applicant when this information was known beforehand. 
Presently, the guidelines would not provide an avenue to address this precursory 
behavior. The Use of Information Technology Systems guideline may need to consider 
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adding language that identifies this behavior as potentially disqualifying unless it can be 
mitigated by a plausible explanation for engaging in the activity.  
6. Operations Security (New) 
In light of the above discussion of lax security habits and operations security, this 
research proposes a new adjudicative guideline for Operations Security. The concerns 
cited above were that lax security habits and operations security could potentially put an 
individual at risk from malicious actors who could obtain their personal information more 
easily, and that it may also show poor judgment or a lack of basic technical abilities 
required to safeguard classified or sensitive information in the information age. Further 
discussion is recommended regarding which specific behaviors to include as 
disqualifying, however some of the most concerning behavior is focused in the operations 
security category of online activities, which includes posting public or official 
information on building locations, floor plans, personal identities, security procedures, 
pictures of key personnel or sites, or embedding geographic metadata in online postings. 
There may also be implications in this new guideline for addressing doxing, in that such 
behavior could be exposing or increasing risk to government assets or operations. Other 
behaviors such as downloading suspicious files or clicking unknown links in spam 
messages may be outside of the scope of disqualifying behavior. However, the 
government may need to consider what basic online personal and operations security 
behaviors it expects from its cleared employees, given the increasingly virtual and 
networked nature of national security and classified information.  
7. Limitations and Avenues for Future Research 
This research has attempted to identify broad trends in insider threat engagement 
in online activities, and compare those activities to the present personnel security 
adjudicative guidelines. However, there are a number of significant limitations to this 
study.  
First the number of insider threat cases studied was extremely limited and used 
primarily to identify specific behaviors of insider threats. A five-year time span was used, 
and only cases taking place in the United States or Canada were examined. The research 
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would benefit from more case studies over a longer period of time and spanning more 
parts of the world in order to get a more complete picture of the online activities of 
insider threats. Second, the adjudicative case tallies taken from the DOHA website 
represent adjudicative appeals considered by only one group of U.S. government 
departments, and do not show adjudicative appeals data for other agencies or 
departments. Future research could seek to include more case studies, gain deeper access 
including subject interviews or site visits, and obtain a greater variety of adjudicative data 
by request from other agencies.  
It is also important to note that this research made a conscious effort to avoid any 
sources that could potentially contain classified or sensitive information. This is 
especially important in understanding the activities of Bradley Manning, as much if not 
all of the information he allegedly disclosed to WikiLeaks has been published on the 
Internet. This research specifically avoided reviewing that information or any resources 
that may have contained that information in order to comply with information security 
guidelines of both DoD and DHS. It is likely, however, that such access may have 
provided additional insight into Manning’s behaviors and activities online. Future 
research conducted by private or foreign entities that are not required to avoid classified 
or official information on the Internet may be able to gain these insights. 
Another limitation of this study is that the list of online activities is based on a 
combination of only one other existing list and the author’s own Internet research on 
other online behaviors. Therefore, the list of online behaviors used in this study does not 
represent a government-wide or discipline-wide assessment of all possible behaviors, but 
a best effort by the author to update and improve upon one effort. Future research could 
bring experts together from a variety of fields to update and validate this list in light of 
social and technological developments since 2009 that the author may not have found.  
Recommendations on changes or modifications to the adjudicative guidelines 
were formulated based on the degree to which the behaviors contained in the online 
activities list were addressed by the guidelines. However, this list was influenced and 
modified as a result of the author’s own online research and observations. Therefore, the 
evaluation of the adjudicative guidelines with respect to that list is also limited by the 
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research abilities and inherent biases of the author. Additionally, the author is employed 
in the personnel security office of a federal government agency, and has a potential bias 
in favor of expanding the capabilities and tools available to investigative and adjudicative 
entities, and less in favor of allowing applicants to expand their current levels of privacy 
by avoiding investigating or adjudicating their online activities.  
A previously mentioned result of this research is regarding the seemingly 
contradictory trends of increasing online behaviors of insider threats and decreasing 
clearance denial cases based on misuse of information technology systems. A hypothesis 
to explain this was proposed, specifically, that a lack of online vetting conducted by 
agencies contributes to a growing blind spot in the personnel security system in which 
insider threats are increasing their online activities but federal agencies are not keeping 
up with their applicants by observing these online activities for disqualifying information. 
A corollary to this hypothesis is that an increase in cybervetting by background 
investigators will result in an increasing number of security clearance denial cases that 
are based on the Use of Information Technology Systems guideline. It should be noted 
that there may be other explanations for these apparently contradictory trends, such as the 
effectiveness of computer security awareness and monitoring programs, or substantive 
changes in the makeup of the security clearance applicant population; it is therefore all 
the more important that this question and hypothesis are examined in further research.  
8. Conclusion 
The Internet and emerging social and technological developments have enabled 
individuals to connect with each other in ways never before possible. Email, chat rooms, 
instant messaging, blogs, and social networking sites are all examples of ways to 
communicate and interact with the world that were not in existence in the public domain 
until recently. In this environment, the U.S. government must find and retain individuals 
for jobs in national security, including those for which a security clearance is needed. 
Background investigations are necessary for government agencies to evaluate the risks 
posed by individuals who may be more likely to cause damage or fail to protect classified 
information. Individuals are investigated and those investigations are adjudicated by the 
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employing agencies according to the personnel security adjudicative guidelines for access 
to classified national security information. These guidelines were issued in 1997 and 
most recently updated in 2005. Some of the most recent technological and social 
developments such as the growing popularity of social media have taken place after this 
time.      
Given these new developments, the adjudicative guidelines may need to be re-
evaluated to ensure they are keeping apace. This research used case studies and 
examination of security clearance appeals data to gain an understanding of the current 
trends in the areas of computer use and government personnel security response. The 
collected data, though limited in scope, appears to tentatively show that Internet activity 
among identified cases of insider threat is increasing, but that the number of proposed 
personnel security clearance denials remains steady or decreasing over the same time 
period. One possible explanation for this is that the present investigative techniques 
employed in background investigations do not search online resources where this insider 
threat activity may be most observable. Instead, investigators still rely on personal 
interviews of applicants, neighbors, friends, and coworkers to complete their 
investigations. Therefore, it is possible that while insider threats are increasing their 
online presence, the personnel security system is not doing the same, which could be 
leading to increasingly less relative visibility of these individuals. If this hypothesis is 
true, then increased use of online resources in the background investigation process could 
result in more, not less, security clearance denial cases due to misuse of IT systems.  
The existing personnel security guidelines did not completely address the variety 
of new behaviors that are possible online. Specifically, improvements are recommended 
in the Foreign Influence, Financial Considerations, Personal Conduct, Handling Protected 
Information, and Use of Information Technology Systems guidelines: 
 
- The Foreign Influence guideline could be strengthened by defining what 
associations or contacts are disqualifying or at least reportable.  
- The Financial Considerations guideline could include language on online 
gaming and virtual currencies.  
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- The Personal Conduct guideline could expand its coverage to include all 
false or misleading information, not just such information when directly 
relevant to employment or the background investigation process.  
- The Handling Protected Information guideline could more specifically 
identify what information is protected, and whether or not unclassified or 
unofficial information could be considered protected especially if it 
involves personal information.  
- The Use of Information Technology Systems guideline could include 
reconnaissance activities such as port scanning or network vulnerability 
assessment, as well as online research of hacking, if these activities are 
conducted in preparation for a possible attack.  
- In addition to the existing guidelines, a new guideline for Operations 
Security could be added, which would address behaviors that put agencies 
and personnel at risk such as exposing locations or details of government 
sites, even if those details are unclassified. 
The above recommendations, along with a broad and ongoing research effort to 
identify emerging technologies and their implications for personnel security, may 
enhance the government’s ability to mitigate insider risk. Consideration of these 
recommended changes to the personnel security adjudicative guidelines by the Office of 
the Director of National Intelligence could lead to a more informed and effective 
personnel security system. This research hopes to contribute toward that end.   
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APPENDIX A: PERSONNEL SECURITY ADJUDICATIVE 
GUIDELINES REFERENCE AID 
A. INTRODUCTION: 
This appendix serves as a reference aid for understanding the disqualifying 
conditions of the Adjudicative Guidelines for Determining Eligibility for Access to 
Classified Information, otherwise referred to simply as the “adjudicative guidelines.” It is 
abbreviated from its complete form to include only the disqualifying factors, which are 
the most relevant to this thesis. The original paragraph markings are maintained from the 
complete guidelines, which accounts for why they will appear out of order here.  This 
appendix does not substitute for the complete guidelines, which are publicly available 
online,91 and its use for any purpose other than as a reference aid for this thesis is 
discouraged. Readers are encouraged to consult the full version for a more complete 
understanding of the adjudicative guidelines.   
B. ALLEGIANCE TO THE UNITED STATES 
4. Conditions that could raise a security concern and may be disqualifying 
include:  
(a) involvement in, support of, training to commit, or advocacy of any act 
of sabotage, espionage, treason, terrorism, or sedition against the United 
States of America;  
 
(b) association or sympathy with persons who are attempting to commit, 
or who are committing, any of the above acts;  
 
(c) association or sympathy with persons or organizations that advocate, 
threaten, or use force or violence, or use any other illegal or 
unconstitutional means, in an effort to:  
 
(1) overthrow or influence the government of the United 
States or any state or local government;  
 
(2) prevent federal, state, or local government personnel 
from performing their official duties;  
                                                 
91 See the Federation of American Scientists website, available at 
http://www.fas.org/sgp/isoo/guidelines.html.  
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(3) gain retribution for perceived wrongs caused by the 
federal, state, or local government;  
 
(4) prevent others from exercising their rights under the 
Constitution or laws of the United States or of any state.  
C. FOREIGN INFLUENCE 
7. Conditions that could raise a security concern and may be disqualifying 
include:  
(a) contact with a foreign family member, business or professional 
associate, friend, or other person who is a citizen of or resident in a foreign 
country if that contact creates a heightened risk of foreign exploitation, 
inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion;  
 
(b) connections to a foreign person, group, government, or country that 
create a potential conflict of interest between the individual's obligation to 
protect sensitive information or technology and the individual's desire to 
help a foreign person, group, or country by providing that information;  
 
(c) counterintelligence information, that may be classified, indicates that 
the individual's access to protected information may involve unacceptable 
risk to national security;  
 
(d) sharing living quarters with a person or persons, regardless of 
citizenship status, if that relationship creates a heightened risk of foreign 
inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion;  
 
(e) a substantial business, financial, or property interest in a foreign 
country, or in any foreign-owned or foreign-operated business, which 
could subject the individual to heightened risk of foreign influence or 
exploitation;  
 
(f) failure to report, when required, association with a foreign national;  
 
(g) unauthorized association with a suspected or known agent, associate, 
or employee of a foreign intelligence service;  
 
(h) indications that representatives or nationals from a foreign country are 
acting to increase the vulnerability of the individual to possible future 
exploitation, inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion;  
 
(i) conduct, especially while traveling outside the U.S., which may make 
the individual vulnerable to exploitation, pressure, or coercion by a foreign 
person, group, government, or country.  
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D. FOREIGN PREFERENCE 
10. Conditions that could raise a security concern and may be disqualifying 
include:  
(a) exercise of any right, privilege or obligation of foreign citizenship after 
becoming a U.S. citizen or through the foreign citizenship of a family 
member. This includes but is not limited to:  
 
(1) possession of a current foreign passport;  
 
(2) military service or a willingness to bear arms for a foreign 
country;  
 
(3) accepting educational, medical, retirement, social welfare, or 
other such benefits from a foreign country;  
 
(4) residence in a foreign country to meet citizenship requirements;  
 
(5) using foreign citizenship to protect financial or business 
interests in another country;  
 
(6) seeking or holding political office in a foreign country;  
 
(7) voting in a foreign election;  
 
(b) action to acquire or obtain recognition of a foreign citizenship by an 
American citizen;  
 
(c) performing or attempting to perform duties, or otherwise acting, so as 
to serve the interests of a foreign person, group, organization, or 
government in conflict with the national security interest;  
 
(d) any statement or action that shows allegiance to a country other than 
the United States: for example, declaration of intent to renounce United 
States citizenship; renunciation of United States citizenship.  
E. SEXUAL BEHAVIOR 
13. Conditions that could raise a security concern and may be disqualifying 
include:  
(a) sexual behavior of a criminal nature, whether or not the individual has 
been prosecuted;  
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(b) a pattern of compulsive, self-destructive, or high-risk sexual behavior 
that the person is unable to stop or that may be symptomatic of a 
personality disorder;  
 
(c) sexual behavior that causes an individual to be vulnerable to coercion, 
exploitation, or duress;  
 
(d) sexual behavior of a public nature and/or that which reflects lack of 
discretion or judgment.  
F. PERSONAL CONDUCT 
15. The following will normally result in an unfavorable clearance action or 
administrative termination of further processing for clearance eligibility:  
 
(a) refusal, or failure without reasonable cause, to undergo or cooperate 
with security processing, including but not limited to meeting with a 
security investigator for subject interview, completing security forms or 
releases, and cooperation with medical or psychological evaluation;  
 
(b) refusal to provide full, frank and truthful answers to lawful questions 
of investigators, security officials, or other official representatives in 
connection with a personnel security or trustworthiness determination.  
 
16. Conditions that could raise a security concern and may be disqualifying also 
include:  
(a) deliberate omission, concealment, or falsification of relevant facts from 
any personnel security questionnaire, personal history statement, or similar 
form used to conduct investigations, determine employment qualifications, 
award benefits or status, determine security clearance eligibility or 
trustworthiness, or award fiduciary responsibilities;  
 
(b) deliberately providing false or misleading information concerning 
relevant facts to an employer, investigator, security official, competent 
medical authority, or other official government representative;  
(c) credible adverse information in several adjudicative issue areas that is 
not sufficient for an adverse determination under any other single 
guideline, but which, when considered as a whole, supports a whole-
person assessment of questionable judgment, untrustworthiness, 
unreliability, lack of candor, unwillingness to comply with rules and 
regulations, or other characteristics indicating that the person may not 
properly safeguard protected information;  
 
(d) credible adverse information that is not explicitly covered under any 
other guideline and may not be sufficient by itself for an adverse 
determination, but which, when combined with all available information 
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supports a whole-person assessment of questionable judgment, 
untrustworthiness, unreliability, lack of candor, unwillingness to comply 
with rules and regulations, or other characteristics indicating that the 
person may not properly safeguard protected information. This includes 
but is not limited to consideration of:  
 
(1) untrustworthy or unreliable behavior to include breach of client 
confidentiality, release of proprietary information, unauthorized 
release of sensitive corporate or other government protected 
information;  
 
(2) disruptive, violent, or other inappropriate behavior in the 
workplace;  
 
(3) a pattern of dishonesty or rule violations;  
 
(4) evidence of significant misuse of Government or other 
employer's time or resources;  
 
(e) personal conduct or concealment of information about one's conduct, 
that creates a vulnerability to exploitation, manipulation, or duress, such as  
 
(1) engaging in activities which, if known, may affect the person's 
personal, professional, or community standing, or (2) while in another 
country, engaging in any activity that is illegal in that country or that is legal 
in that country but illegal in the United States and may serve as a basis for 
exploitation or pressure by the foreign security or intelligence service or other 
group;  
 
(f) violation of a written or recorded commitment made by the individual 
to the employer as a condition of employment;  
 
(g) association with persons involved in criminal activity.  
G. FINANCIAL CONSIDERATIONS 
19. Conditions that could raise a security concern and may be disqualifying 
include:  
(a) inability or unwillingness to satisfy debts;  
 
(b) indebtedness caused by frivolous or irresponsible spending and the 
absence of any evidence of willingness or intent to pay the debt or 
establish a realistic plan to pay the debt.  
 
(c) a history of not meeting financial obligations;  
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(d) deceptive or illegal financial practices such as embezzlement, 
employee theft, check fraud, income tax evasion, expense account fraud, 
filing deceptive loan statements, and other intentional financial breaches 
of trust;  
 
(e) consistent spending beyond one's means, which may be indicated by 
excessive indebtedness, significant negative cash flow, high debt-to-
income ratio, and/or other financial analysis;  
 
(f) financial problems that are linked to drug abuse, alcoholism, gambling 
problems, or other issues of security concern.  
 
(g) failure to file annual Federal, state, or local income tax returns as 
required or the fraudulent filing of the same;  
 
(h) unexplained affluence, as shown by a lifestyle or standard of living, 
increase in net worth, or money transfers that cannot be explained by 
subject's known legal sources of income;  
 
(i) compulsive or addictive gambling as indicated by an unsuccessful 
attempt to stop gambling, "chasing losses" (i.e. increasing the bets or 
returning another day in an effort to get even), concealment of gambling 
losses, borrowing money to fund gambling or pay gambling debts, family 
conflict or other problems caused by gambling.  
H. ALCOHOL CONSUMPTION 
22. Conditions that could raise a security concern and may be disqualifying 
include:  
(a) alcohol-related incidents away from work, such as driving while under 
the influence, fighting, child or spouse abuse, disturbing the peace, or 
other incidents of concern, regardless of whether the individual is 
diagnosed as an alcohol abuser or alcohol dependent;  
 
(b) alcohol-related incidents at work, such as reporting for work or duty in 
an intoxicated or impaired condition, or drinking on the job, regardless of 
whether the individual is diagnosed as an alcohol abuser or alcohol 
dependent;  
 
(c) habitual or binge consumption of alcohol to the point of impaired 
judgment, regardless of whether the individual is diagnosed as an alcohol 
abuser or alcohol dependent;  
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(d) diagnosis by a duly qualified medical professional (e.g., physician, 
clinical psychologist, or psychiatrist) of alcohol abuse or alcohol 
dependence;  
 
(e) evaluation of alcohol abuse or alcohol dependence by a licensed 
clinical social worker who is a staff member of a recognized alcohol 
treatment program;  
 
(f) relapse after diagnosis of alcohol abuse or dependence and completion 
of an alcohol rehabilitation program;  
 
(g) failure to follow any court order regarding alcohol education, 
evaluation, treatment, or abstinence.  
I. DRUG INVOLVEMENT 
25. Conditions that could raise a security concern and may be disqualifying 
include:  
(a) Any drug abuse;  
 
(b) testing positive for illegal drug use;  
 
(c) illegal drug possession, including cultivation, processing, manufacture, 
purchase, sale, or distribution; or possession of drug paraphernalia;  
 
(d) diagnosis by a duly qualified medical professional (e.g., physician, 
clinical psychologist, or psychiatrist) of drug abuse or drug dependence;  
 
(e) evaluation of drug abuse or drug dependence by a licensed clinical 
social worker who is a staff member of a recognized drug treatment 
program;  
(f) failure to successfully complete a drug treatment program prescribed 
by a duly qualified medical professional;  
 
(g) any illegal drug use after being granted a security clearance;  
 
(h) expressed intent to continue illegal drug use, or failure to clearly and 
convincingly commit to discontinue drug use.  
J. PSYCHOLOGICAL CONDITIONS 
28. Conditions that could raise a security concern and may be disqualifying 
include:  
(a) behavior that casts doubt on an individual's judgment, reliability, or 
trustworthiness that is not covered under any other guideline, including 
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but not limited to emotionally unstable, irresponsible, dysfunctional, 
violent, paranoid, or bizarre behavior;  
 
(b) an opinion by a duly qualified mental health professional that the 
individual has a condition not covered under any other guideline that may 
impair judgment, reliability, or trustworthiness;  
 
(c) the individual has failed to follow treatment advice related to a 
diagnosed emotional, mental, or personality condition, e.g. failure to take 
prescribed medication.  
K. CRIMINAL CONDUCT 
31. Conditions that could raise a security concern and may be disqualifying 
include:  
(a) a single serious crime or multiple lesser offenses;  
 
(b) discharge or dismissal from the Armed Forces under dishonorable 
conditions;  
 
(c) allegation or admission of criminal conduct, regardless of whether the 
person was formally charged, formally prosecuted or convicted;  
 
(d) individual is currently on parole or probation;  
 
(e) violation of parole or probation, or failure to complete a court-
mandated rehabilitation program.  
L. HANDLING PROTECTED INFORMATION 
34. Conditions that could raise a security concern and may be disqualifying 
include:  
(a) deliberate or negligent disclosure of classified or other protected 
information to unauthorized persons, including but not limited to personal 
or business contacts, to the media, or to persons present at seminars, 
meetings, or conferences;  
 
(b) collecting or storing classified or other protected information in any 
unauthorized location;  
 
(c) loading, drafting, editing, modifying, storing, transmitting, or 
otherwise handling classified reports, data, or other information on any 
unapproved equipment including but not limited to any typewriter, word 
processor, or computer hardware, software, drive, system, gameboard, 
handheld, "palm" or pocket device or other adjunct equipment;  
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(d) inappropriate efforts to obtain or view classified or other protected 
information outside one's need to know;  
 
(e) copying classified or other protected information in a manner designed 
to conceal or remove classification or other document control markings;  
 
(f) viewing or downloading information from a secure system when the 
information is beyond the individual's need to know;  
 
(g) any failure to comply with rules for the protection of classified or other 
sensitive information;  
 
(h) negligence or lax security habits that persist despite counseling by 
management;  
 
(i) failure to comply with rules or regulations that results in damage to the 
National Security, regardless of whether it was deliberate or negligent.  
M. OUTSIDE ACTIVITIES  
37. Conditions that could raise a security concern and may be disqualifying 
include:  
(a) any employment or service, whether compensated or volunteer, with:  
 
(1) the government of a foreign country;  
 
(2) any foreign national, organization, or other entity;  
(3) a representative of any foreign interest;  
 
(4) any foreign, domestic, or international organization or person 
engaged in analysis, discussion, or publication of material on 
intelligence, defense, foreign affairs, or protected technology;  
 
(b) failure to report or fully disclose an outside activity when this is 
required.  
N. USE OF INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY SYSTEMS 
40. Conditions that could raise a security concern and may be disqualifying 
include:  
(a) illegal or unauthorized entry into any information technology system or 
component thereof;  
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(b) illegal or unauthorized modification, destruction, manipulation or 
denial of access to information, software, firmware, or hardware in an 
information technology system;  
 
(c) use of any information technology system to gain unauthorized access 
to another system or to a compartmented area within the same system;  
 
(d) downloading, storing, or transmitting classified information on or to 
any unauthorized software, hardware, or information technology system;  
 
(e) unauthorized use of a government or other information technology 
system;  
 
(f) introduction, removal, or duplication of hardware, firmware, software, 
or media to or from any information technology system without 
authorization, when prohibited by rules, procedures, guidelines or 
regulations.  
 
(g) negligence or lax security habits in handling information technology 
that persist despite counseling by management;  
 
(h) any misuse of information technology, whether deliberate or negligent, 




















APPENDIX C.  PROPOSED OPERATIONS SECURITY GUIDELINE 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This thesis made a number of recommendations for updating the Adjudicative 
Guidelines for Determining Eligibility for Access to Classified Information.  One 
recommendation was the creation of a new guideline for operations security.  In support 
of this recommendation, this appendix contains an example of what that new guideline 
could entail.  This example is provided only as a starting point for discussion and is open 
to further review and development by the personnel security community. 
B. GUIDELINE N: OPERATIONS SECURITY (PROPOSED) 
42. The Concern.  A failure to protect government personnel, information, 
information systems, equipment, and buildings from exposure to unknown, untrusted, or 
potentially adversarial persons, organizations, or other entities, raises doubts about an 
individual’s trustworthiness, judgment, reliability, or willingness and ability to safeguard 
government operations.  
43. Conditions that could raise a security concern and may be disqualifying 
include:  
(a) deliberate or negligent disclosure of sensitive government operations 
information to unauthorized persons, including but not limited to personal 
or business contacts, the media, internet postings, or social networking 
platforms;  
 
(b) deliberate or negligent disclosure of personal information of federal, 
tribal, state, or local government personnel without permission, including 
but not limited to home addresses, personal phone numbers, personal 
email addresses, date of birth, social security number, places of worship, 
places of recreation, employment history, or any such information with the 
intent of influencing, intimidating, blackmailing, harassing, or coercing 
government personnel. 
 
(c) deliberate or negligent disclosure of personal information of family 
members or close associates of federal, tribal, state, or local government 
personnel without permission, with the intent of influencing, intimidating, 
blackmailing, harassing, or coercing government personnel.  
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(d) deliberate or negligent disclosure of operations security information 
that enables, facilitates, supports, leads to, or results in criminal activity 
 
(e) association or sympathy with persons who are attempting to commit, or 
who are committing, any of the above acts;  
 
(f) inappropriate efforts to obtain or view sensitive government operations 
information outside one’s need to know 
 
(g) negligence or lax operations security habits that persist despite 
counseling by management 
 
44. Conditions that could mitigate security concerns include: 
(a) so much time has elapsed since the behavior happened, or it happened 
under such unusual circumstances, that it is unlikely to recur or does not 
cast doubt on the individual's reliability, trustworthiness, or good 
judgment; 
 
(b) the individual responded favorably to counseling or remedial security 
training and now demonstrates a positive attitude toward the discharge of 
operations security responsibilities; 
 
(c) the operations security violations were due to improper or inadequate 
training; 
 
(d) the conduct was unintentional or inadvertent and was followed by a 
prompt, good-faith effort to correct the situation and by notification of any 
affected parties; 
 
(e) association with persons involved in such activities has ceased or 
occurs under circumstances that do not cast doubt upon the individual's 
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